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# THE MONTH

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*Reply by*

**Rev. Dr. E. L. Mascall**

to Fr. A. A. Stephenson's  
article *Oceania and Identifiability*  
in **THE MONTH**, December  
1955, with

*Rejoinder by*


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to Dr. E. L. Mascall

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# DAWN ON THE SIERRA OF GREDOS

By  
ROY CAMPBELL

WHILE those of us by Tagus stray  
Whom careless Valkyries forgot  
Or stayed behind with, on the spot—  
(Your hair the night, your face the day!)  
And others ride the Milky Way  
Whose hearts with "greater love" were shot—

In what new Tercio, what battalion,  
Serves now our recent Alferez,<sup>1</sup>  
The Legionary angel, Death,  
The rider of the pale grey stallion,  
Who paid the godless hordes their tallion,  
And made their wrath a waste of breath?

The last of four tall shades, he's ridden,  
Along the eastward mountain-track,  
Their faces in sombreros hidden,  
Through their four great horses known—  
The riders of the White, the Black,  
The Colorado, and his own.

He will return, but not to harm,  
Rather to rest us, and relieve.  
He will come back, but as on leave  
Or visiting some friendly farm—  
No more in the thunderclouds to sleeve  
The lightning of his strong right arm.

<sup>1</sup> Pronounced "Alferéth."

Like young Morato's eagle heart  
His own grew wings, and would not stay  
When all our best had got the start,  
Outstripped the flesh, their service done,  
And joined new Tercios in the Sun  
To guard the frontiers of the Day.

High on the Gredos, near the sky,  
His iron hand our own we clapped in  
Returning earthwards, Life and I,  
When on his way we wished him well,  
Now in the Seraphim to Captain  
Promoted for contempt of Hell.

The shades of night began to trickle  
Away, like those whom late the Sickle  
And Hammer led to shame and loss  
By their own emblems laid quiescent—  
So deftly Sickled by the Crescent,  
So soundly Hammered with the Cross.

There where the Gredos drops so sheer,  
Rearing my horse to wave goodbye,  
I caught my lifted cattle-spear  
Entangled in the dawn-lit sky  
As though some canopy to rear  
Or streaming oriflamme to fly.

From Africa away to France,  
Flag-tethered to so frail a lance,  
It tugged and thundered in my hold—  
A whole horizon of horizons  
Where crimson clouds, like herds of bisons,  
Migrated over wastes of gold.

Like the tall aloe-stem that towers  
To hoard the sunsets as they die,  
Till (once a century) it flowers  
And gives them back to later days,  
From lion-throated blooms ablaze  
To roar its fragrance through the sky.

Like that lit stem, my lance outbroke  
With clouds of pollen for its smoke  
Igniting into tongues of praise,  
While birds, the solar Aviation,  
Like morning stars at the creation  
Exulting, magnified the rays.

Range over range around us rolled  
With snow-peaks turning green and gold  
And crimson. Nearer to the eye  
The Guadarramas rose, like surges  
Serrated, when the northwind scourges  
Their tops, and makes the spindrift fly.

A swift arcade of poplars white,  
The steep Alberchë swerved from sight  
And in the Tagus sought its father,  
And now the day, itself, showed white  
Like wingéd Victory poised for flight  
In the far wreck of the Alcazar.<sup>1</sup>

Down where the lyddite and the "nitro"  
Had scorched the base of the sierras,  
Blossoming almonds, row on white row,  
And flowering peaches, row on red row,  
Shelved glimmering down by tier and terrace  
To the Arenas of San Pedro.

I felt as one who bears the dais  
At Corpus, when our King's proud way is,  
And wondrous light around him waves,  
A rose-red nimbus, trawling fires,  
It harps the long dark streets like lyres,  
As water harps the walls of caves.

Toledo's streets those fissured kloofs  
Appeared: those ranges seemed her walls,  
With woods for people on the roofs,  
With cliffs for balconies, for shawls,  
The flowering orchards in their falls,  
Descending from our horses' hoofs.

<sup>1</sup> Pronounced "Alcathar" in possible assonance with "father."

The day, exultant and serene,  
 In slow procession passed between  
 Till like a Phoenix, bleeding fire,  
 Shot through with arrows of desire,  
 The Monstrance in the sun was seen  
 To flame with love as Hell with ire—

The sun, with resurrected brow,  
 Who dies each day, to teach us how,  
 Who feeds his blaze with deaths of men  
 Until it shall devour the sky,  
 And make the abyss one huge round eye  
 Of wonder to adore it then.

I know that blaze, though worlds should shatter,  
 Is afterclothing for the sprite,  
 Its flesh, when it has taken flight.  
 For light's the absolute of Matter,  
 And what the light is to the latter,  
 The Intellect is to the light.

It is the stuff our comrades burn to  
 Like incense rising from the mire.  
 It is the source our bodies yearn to  
 And our crusading hearts aspire,  
 Out of the dust that they return to  
 Translated into song and fire.

We gazed into that light primordial  
 That filled with love the whole vast region  
 Whereunto Death had passed from here:  
 So comradely, so frank, so cordial—  
 Like re-enlisting in the Legion  
 It made the thought of Death appear.

Freed from the locustries of Marx,  
 The plain sent up a myriad larks,  
 And Life and I, with time to spare,  
 Rode homeward down the slope abreast,  
 And hung our rifles up to rest  
 And yoked the oxen to the share.

Talavera 1939.

# C. S. LEWIS

By

THOMAS CORBISHLEY

WHEN MR. C. S. LEWIS left Oxford a year ago to become Professor Lewis at Cambridge, it might almost be said that the senior University had shown herself the home of another lost cause. For over twenty years, by word of mouth and with untiring pen, he had proved not only that the roles of literary critic and Christian apologist are entirely compatible, but that the best literary criticism must be based on that complete humanism which, in fact, is only to be found in those who accept the fullness of the Christian truth. In thus allowing him to depart, Oxford was to some extent surrendering to the demands of those who had not yet seen that rationalism with all its progeny is already dated.

Remarkable as are the achievements of the English School at Oxford there can be little doubt that Mr. Lewis has been one of its brightest ornaments both in his published works, including *The Allegory of Love* and *The Sixteenth Century* in the *Oxford History of English Literature*, and also in his immensely successful lectures. He shows a range of knowledge and a depth of penetration never surpassed, and not often equalled by his colleagues. During the years immediately after the end of the war no lecturer in any School attracted a larger and more varied audience. Nor, incidentally, in the more intimate circles of Senior Common Rooms has Oxford known many wittier or more urbane talkers.

In the larger world C. S. L. has come to represent something of what G. K. C. meant in the first quarter of this century. As a writer indeed Professor Lewis is more polished than Mr. Chesterton, but they are very similar in their broad humanity, their sheer common sense and their immense ability to relate the ordinary concerns and simple aspirations of mankind to the abiding verities as revealed in the Christian faith. They are alike, too, in their refusal to be stampeded out of traditional positions by any fear of being thought old-fashioned or not "in the swim." When Mr. Lewis wrote *Pilgrim's Regress* many years ago, he



showed up the hollowness and silliness of so many ideas which had long been current in "advanced" circles. In fact, that book is probably the most characteristic as it is certainly the most effective of all his religious writings, at least prior to his latest work, *Surprised by Joy*<sup>1</sup>. Postponing for the present any further consideration of this last work, let us briefly recall some of the salient features of the earlier one. Stated baldly, it is the account of a search by the pilgrim John for the Western Mountains, the delectable land of which he had caught a glimpse in childhood, and the quest for which brought him many strange adventures in much strange company. Frustrated again and again, assured by many whom he encountered that he was pursuing an unsubstantial mirage, he nevertheless fought his way through all obstacles, finding unexpected help when he seemed lost, and learning that it was only by rejecting an object of immediate satisfaction that he could come to that which he really desired.

*Pilgrim's Regress* was not a popular book, and it may be that it was almost too crowded and too elaborate to satisfy those whose need was for a much simpler statement of Christian truth, a much simpler answer to their personal problems. At any rate, for a time Mr. Lewis reverted to the more direct form of apologetic, and probably the book which has had widest appeal is his collection of broadcast talks on the basis of Christian ethics and the fundamental Christian doctrines. In the clarity of their language and the simplicity and even homeliness of their illustrations they must have brought reassurance and comfort to many who had been dismayed by the superficial cleverness of so much anti-Christian polemic. Brief and compressed as they were, they necessarily at times lacked something of that rich humanity and profound spiritual insight which are characteristic of our author at his best. But for all that, they remain invaluable because they demonstrate that a man can be both a convinced Christian and a highly intelligent and imaginative writer.

Psychological insight, subtlety of wit and great imaginativeness are revealed in *Screwtape Letters*, which might be no more than a great joke, only, because the laugh is against the devil, it becomes a serious contribution to spiritual literature. With it perhaps ought to be linked *The Great Divorce*, a sober and almost macabre study of the terrible responsibility of human freedom, and the

<sup>1</sup> *Surprised by Joy, The Shape of My Early Life* (Geoffrey Bles 1955).

abiding consequences of human choices. The two books together might almost seem to be inspired by a development of certain themes in the *Spiritual Exercises* of St. Ignatius.

In *The Problem of Pain* which sets out boldly to refute what is probably the most powerful argument in the atheist's armoury, we see again and again how the humanity and spirituality of the writer emerge in a discussion which ranges from a consideration of the prosaic fact of suffering to a profound and passionate preaching of the abiding love of God. In a striking sentence he reminds us that "God whispers to us in our pleasures, speaks in our conscience but shouts in our pains: it is His megaphone to rouse a deaf world," and there is an echo of the theme of the *Pilgrim's Regress*, "God will look to every soul like its first love, because He is its first love."

So we return to that theme, the experience which Professor Lewis now labels as "Joy"—"the thing I am speaking of is not an experience. You have experienced only the want of it. The thing itself has never actually been embodied in any thought or image or emotion." Or, as he puts it in his latest work, it is the quality "of an unsatisfied desire which is itself more desirable than any other satisfaction. I call it Joy which is here a technical term and must be sharply distinguished both from Happiness and from Pleasure. Joy (in my sense) has indeed one characteristic, and one only, in common with them; the fact that anyone who has experienced it will want it again."

There, to have is to want and to want is to have. Thus, the very moment when I longed to be so stabbed again was itself again such a stabbing. The Desirable which had once alighted on Valhalla was now alighting on a particular moment of my own past; and I would not recognise him there because, being an idolater and a formalist, I insisted that he ought to appear in the temple I had built him; not knowing that he cares only for temple-building and not at all for temples built. Wordsworth, I believe, made this mistake all his life. I am sure that all that sense of the loss of vanished vision which fills *The Prelude* was itself vision of the same kind, if only he could have believed it.

Only someone who has been driven into himself by life, only someone who has found his greatest wealth in books, and books of a certain kind, will have developed this inner life to such an extent; yet all who are given to reflection on their own states of

mind will recognise what is being described. Not, of course, that this is the only life even of such a man. As Professor Lewis says, referring to his first discovery of what he calls "Northernness":

From that first moment . . . my secret, imaginative life began to be so important and so distinct from my outer life that I almost have to tell two separate stories . . . by the imaginative life I here mean only my life as concerned with Joy—including in the outer life much that would ordinarily be called imagination, as, for example, much of my reading, and all my erotic or ambitious fantasies; for these are self-regarding. . . .

However, lest these quotations leave the impression that the author of *Surprised by Joy* is a morbid, introspective and almost neurotic type, it is necessary to assure the reader that the "roughness and density of life," the sheer actuality of ordinary experience is something insisted on again and again. Mr. Lewis admits indeed that had it not been for a friendship made in boyhood he might never have learnt to balance his romanticism by an appreciation of the homely. "Often he recalled my eyes from the horizon just to look through a hole in the hedge, to see nothing more than a farmyard in its mid-morning solitude, and perhaps a grey cat squeezing its way under a barn door, or a bent old woman with a wrinkled motherly face going back with an empty bucket from the pigstye."

Equally false would it be to think of the book as a solemn, humourless affair. Thus, on a voyage to Ireland his brother is seasick. "I absurdly envy him this accomplishment. He is behaving as experienced travellers should. By great efforts I succeed in vomiting; but it is a poor affair—I was and am an obstinately good sailor." And, in a brilliant character study of a teacher to whom he recognises an immense debt, he describes how "one curious trait from his Presbyterian youth survived. He always, on Sunday, gardened in a different, and slightly more respectable suit. An Ulster Scot may come to disbelieve in God, but not to wear his weekday clothes on the Sabbath." And this from an account of his dog Tim: "He never exactly obeyed you. He sometimes agreed with you."

Two glimpses may be given of the way in which his common sense illuminates a topic and opens up wide horizons, "The very formula, '*Naus* means a ship,' is wrong. *Naus* and ship both mean a thing, they do not mean one another. Behind *Naus* as behind

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*navis* or *naca*, we want to have a picture of a dark, slender mass with sail or oars, climbing the ridges with no officious English word intruding." Or, again, "The truest and most horrible claim made for modern transport is that it 'annihilates space.' It does. It annihilates one of the most glorious gifts we have been given . . . of course, if a man hates space and wants it to be annihilated that is another matter. Why not creep into his coffin at once? There is little enough space there."

The fact that such a four-square man could find no lasting satisfaction save in the acceptance of the Christian faith is a not insignificant contribution to Christian apologetics. Professor Lewis has put us all in his debt by his frank and convincing account of this acceptance. It would be impertinent, even if it were possible, to summarise what cannot be abbreviated or synopsised without gross injustice. The story must be read in its fullness from the first uneasy suspicion that Christianity, or at least Theism, had the answer to his quest for Joy until the moment when the prodigal was "brought in kicking, struggling, resentful, and darting his eyes in every direction for a chance of escape."

But what, in conclusion, of Joy? for that, after all is what the story has mainly been about. To tell you the truth the subject has lost nearly all interest for me since I became a Christian . . . I know now that the experience, considered as a state of my own mind, has never had the kind of importance I once gave it. It was valuable only as a pointer to something other and outer. . . . When we are lost in the woods the sight of a sign-post is a great matter. He who first sees it cries "Look!" The whole party gathers round and stares. But when we have found the road and are passing sign-posts every few miles, we shall not stop and stare. They will encourage us and we shall be grateful to the authority that set them up . . . .

These horribly inadequate pages must seem like a patronising attempt to "evaluate the significance of" Professor Lewis. They are not that. They are meant to be a humble acknowledgement of a great sense of gratitude evoked by the consideration of a man whose intelligence, sensibility, integrity and what may best be described as forthrightness, have brought him face to face with a shining vision which is all too often obscured by the mists of "modern thought," "humanism" and the like. The warmth and the brightness which he brings on to the scene should serve to dissipate the mists of many another.

# MAGIC AND SCRUPLE<sup>1</sup>

By

E. B. STRAUSS

CATHOLICS in Great Britain are said to enjoy a poor reputation for appreciating their own "intellectuals." So much the worse for them; for important men themselves, once they have passed to their eternal rest, are safe from the sting of inadequate recognition. When they are alive, however, they are apt to be worked to death whilst at the same time encountering a sharply ambivalent attitude from their fellow-Catholics. Anyhow, that is what happened in the case of Fr. Leycester King. It is all the more remarkable, therefore, that his memory should be perpetuated by the endowment of memorial lectures, the first of which I have been invited to deliver. I should like to thank the trustees for the great honour they have conferred on me thereby, and my audience for joining me in paying posthumous respect in this way to a great psychologist and a noble priest.

Leycester King was born at Herne Hill, Dulwich, on 7 July 1896, and was educated at Kent College, Canterbury, and the City of London School.

He joined the army on leaving school and served for seven years—from 1914–16 as an infantry officer in the H.A.C. and East Yorks Regiment, and from 1916 onwards as the technical workshops officer in mechanical transport with the R.A.S.C. In later years, when he specialised in experimental psychology and designed and made most of his own apparatus—the Leycester King Electrical Chronoscope has remained unsurpassed—this period of service in the workshops of the R.A.S.C. must have stood him in excellent stead.

This product of a Nonconformist home was received into the Church on 15 September 1920, in Egypt; and resigned his commission in order to enter the Jesuit noviceship at Manresa a year later. He told one of his contemporaries in the noviceship that he had first offered himself to the Franciscans, but was told

<sup>1</sup> This, the first Leycester King Memorial Lecture, was delivered to the Newman Association on 13 October, 1955.



by them that he would find much greater scope for his talents in the Society of Jesus. He took his first vows on 8 September 1923. He was at St. Mary's Hall, Stonyhurst, and Heythrop from 1924 to 1927, where he took his course of philosophy. He studied theology from 1927 to 1931, being ordained on 8 September 1930. He spent a year at St. Beuno's, 1931-32, where he did his Tertianship. He was a student of the German University of Prague from 1932 until 1934, and, on his return to England, was appointed Professor of Rational and Experimental Psychology at Heythrop, serving at the same time as Spiritual Father to the students of philosophy there for the first six years.

During the early years of the formation of the sub-Faculty of Psychology at Oxford he lectured there, and resided at Campion Hall. I know from personal conversations with Professor Stephenson, Professor Zangwill and others of his colleagues there of the high regard in which they held him, both as a psychologist and as a man. At the same time, he acted as spiritual adviser to the Newman Association, and lived for a while at Portman Square, when he carried the whole organisation on his already overburdened shoulders. He transferred his laboratory from Heythrop to Manresa where he lived from 1950 onwards.

He went to America on a lecture-tour in June 1953; and on 16 September a taxi in which he was driving from Chicago Station to Loyola University collided with the car in front of it. His nose was badly damaged; and the hypertension from which he had been suffering for a number of years assumed an alarming level. He was flown back to England and was admitted to St. John and St. Elizabeth's Hospital on 23 October of that year. Attempts were made by eminent urological surgeons to reduce his blood-pressure; and he uncomplainingly went through agonies of pain and discomfort before his death on 28 December. His cheerfulness and uninterrupted intellectual curiosity were a source of inspiration to his friends who visited him at St. John and St. Elizabeth's.

To add yet a few more bare bones of biographical detail, it would not be out of place to include the brief entry in *The Catholic Who's Who*: "Father Leycester King, Lecturer in Institute of Education, University of London; Fellow of British Psychological Society; Member of British Social Hygiene Council and Central Council for Health Education; Founder-member of United Europe Movement; President of International Catholic

Congress of Psychiatry and Clinical Psychology 1949, 1950; Contributor to THE MONTH, etc."

He published little; and his style was awkward. However, the content of what he wrote was always to the point; and his two short books—*The Way to End the Leakage* and *Sex Enlightenment and the Catholic*—ought not to be forgotten.

Fr. Leycester King was a founder-member of, and first chaplain to, the Catholic Psychological Society, of which I was the first President. It was then—in the late 'twenties, I think—that our paths first crossed. Thereafter, we were forceful, but tolerant, critics of each other, and affectionate friends.

I told him over and over again that his work as an experimental psychologist would inevitably suffer if he allowed himself to be drawn into the field of medical psychology, and that it was in the long run impossible for a priest to try to combine the roles of *sacerdos* and psychotherapist. Unfortunately, he regarded it as his apostolic duty to offer psychiatric advice to the hundreds of his fellow-Catholics who were distressed or disturbed in mind, who came to consult him. Who is to say that he was wrong? Nevertheless, I am convinced that he undertook far more work and responsibility than a priest, even of Fr. Leycester King's calibre, could safely envisage, and was thereby in no small measure responsible for his own early death.

In the lecture that follows, entitled "Magic and Scruple," it may perhaps become apparent why the roles of psychopomp and spiritual director cannot be usefully combined.

Every Catholic priest is only too familiar with the scrupulous penitent, although he finds scrupulosity as difficult to cope with as a psychiatrist does. The non-Catholic medical student, on the other hand, does not know the special meaning of the word scruple, even though, if properly trained, he can provide a descriptive definition of obsessive-compulsive neurosis. In point of fact, scrupulosity, in the Catholic sense, represents obsessive-compulsive neurosis expressing itself in a religious framework. From this it may be inferred that scruples are not primarily a spiritual disorder but essentially psychoneurotic in nature. For that reason alone, scruples are the concern of the doctor rather than of the priest, anyhow so far as attempted therapeutic interference is involved.

In obsessive-compulsive neurosis there is characteristically a



perseveration of emotionally over-toned and irrational, even if logical, trains of thought which may take the form of doubts, guilt-feelings or phobic preoccupations. Combined with this tendency to obsessive thinking there is a compulsion repeatedly to perform certain (largely ritual) acts. The driving force behind these compulsions is as often as not a strong feeling that, unless the acts are carried out, some terrible disaster will befall the person or his loved ones.

Why, it may be asked, is this disorder regarded as a psychoneurosis rather than as a psychosis? In layman's language, why is a scrupulant not regarded as being mad, rather than just odd? The answer is that the true obsessive-compulsive neurotic has perfect insight into the irrational nature of his symptoms, although he can do nothing about them.

Thus, such a person may have an obsessive fear of germs and of certain kinds of body-dirt. This compels him to wash his hands at least forty-nine times a day, and to count up to seven every time he soaps each finger. He cannot be quite sure that he has in fact performed the purification-rite correctly ("Did I really count up to seven, or only to five, when I scrubbed the middle finger of my left hand?") and must consequently start afresh. Such a person, if a Catholic, can never be quite sure that he has made a good confession: did he really mention all his sins; did he unwittingly—or perhaps wittingly, God help him!—give the priest a wrong impression; did he truly have enough contrition for the formula of absolution to be valid?

This picture, necessarily very abridged, is typical enough of the disorder which we are considering; but, it will be well understood, the possible variations on the theme are almost infinite.

The interpretation of the neurosis in causal terms will depend on the school of psychopathology to which a psychiatrist is wedded. For example, a psychoanalyst will provide a neat interpretation expressed in terms of unresolved Oedipus-guilt and the fixation of the libido at certain pre-genital levels. (Please do not expect me, in the short time at my disposal, to translate this into intelligible English.) It may be so; but I have known of obsessive-compulsive neurotics who have submitted to orthodox psychoanalysis for eleven years or more—four or five one-hour sessions a week—without deriving any benefit whatsoever! I myself am not in the fortunate position of being able to

subscribe to any such clear-cut psychopathological formulations. However, I would declare boldly that every scrupulant, in other words, every obsessive-compulsive neurotic, is a person whose thought- and feeling-processes have remained arrested at, or have regressed to, the level of magical thinking.

Speaking analogically—it must be remembered that every system of dynamic psychology deals in analogies rather than with scientific statements purporting to express the nature of things in fixed or quasi-mathematical terms—it may be said that the human psyche records like the rings in a tree-trunk the various phases of the social and moral evolution of the race. One of these phases, with its roots in the distant eras of pre-history, which is still in this age of “enlightenment” dangerously present, is that of catathymic or magical thinking.

One of the charges brought against Catholicism is that it is a magical system and that any religion based on a system of sacraments must necessarily be so. I will, therefore, devote the greater part of the time that remains to me to the consideration of the essential differences between magic and true religion; for I think that Leycester King, who was a considerable theologian as well as everything else, would have liked me to do so.

In view of the vast field covered by the magical arts, it is difficult to provide a short definition of an entirely satisfying nature. The most condensed definition might well be: magic is the art of producing an effect by disproportionate causes. The somewhat clumsy definition to be found in the *Oxford English Dictionary* reads as follows: “The pretended art of influencing the course of events, and of producing marvellous physical phenomena, by processes supposed to owe their efficacy to their powers of compelling the intervention of spiritual beings or of bringing into operation some occult principle of nature; sorcery, witchcraft.”

The word is derived, of course, from the Magi, an aristocratic caste in Persia, particularly interested in astronomy and astrology.

Magic, as defined above, presupposes a nexus—the principle of a certain determinism in the universe. Hence, it would be true to say that magic is the true precursor of natural science rather than of religion, which latter is content, anyhow in its earlier formulations, to allow this principle to remain a mystery rather than to seek to explain and exploit it.

In 1923, Professor Lynn Thorndike, in his two-volume work *A History of Magic and Experimental Science*, clearly establishes the origins of modern science from their magical beginnings. Scientists who offer the *tu quoque* rejoinder to religionists should ponder this.

As this is not an anthropological study, I find it convenient to classify magic in the popular way under the two headings "white" and "black." White magic is not magic at all in the strict sense, for nobody need be taken in by it. Thus, a conjuror calls himself a magician; and his professional association in England is known as The Magic Circle. Further, a practitioner of any of the physical arts in advance of his time came to be regarded as a magician by the uninstructed. For this reason, St. Albert the Great, whose scientific speculations were well ahead of his age, was known as a magus, a magician. Another branch of white magic was (and still is) concerned with healing and curative processes. Fellow-psychotherapists, please note. I, for one, am content to be regarded at appropriate times as a competent white magician rather than as a dogmatic, but phoney, scientist.

Both white magic in its healing aspects and black magic, which will be more closely examined shortly, were condemned by the Jewish religion and later by Christianity—cf. the early Fathers and the Canon Lawyers—for very good reasons: the Jews with their fierce monotheistic loyalty to God as a spirit could not allow themselves to be identified with the elaborate magical systems of Egypt and Philistia; and the Early Church, in the same way, revolted against the magic and superstition of Greece, Rome and Alexandria. This, amongst other things, compelled both Jews and Christians to develop a science of theology if magic were not to offer overwhelmingly strong competition to religion. As will become apparent over and over again in what follows, the religionist is under service to "divinity," by object or mode: he is a servant of God. The magician, on the other hand, seeks to capture and compel the divinity or demon, whether good or bad. The object is clearly to obtain and use power of set purpose. Whatever form the magical process may take—uttering the "true" name of the god or demon (Names of Power), incantation, ceremonial, witches' brews of various kinds (cf. *Macbeth*), the same principle is always involved, namely *compulsion*.

We can thus see that the Christian concept of miracle differs

essentially from an unusual event allegedly brought about by magic: miracle represents a *free* interposition of divinity; a magical event the inevitable working-out of an arbitrarily imposed chain of cause and effect. Compare the shower of rain following the sympathetic magic of a witch-doctor with the rain that may follow prayer. Even if rain follows prayer, a Christian might be in danger of falling into superstition if he assumed that it was necessarily due to divine intervention, whereas the clients of the witch-doctor have no doubt about the simple chain of cause and effect. All Christian prayer is based upon the Lord's Prayer which contains the all-important condition: "Thy will be done"—not "*my* will be enforced."

Again, and fundamentally for the same reasons, a sacrament is as far removed from magic as it very well could be. A sacrament depends on the Divinity freely covenanting: "Do this in memory of me"—to take the Church's most important sacrament as an example. It is the *sensible sign* which produces the invisible effect which it signifies. Magic would be involved if it operated by its own power. It is a case of supernatural virtue producing a supernatural effect, but it is only an instrument. Material things—the common things of life, bread, wine, oil, salt and water may necessarily be utilised, but they undergo no physical change in the course of their sacramental employment. God is truly present, and in a very special sense, in the consecrated elements, but His presence is supernatural, dependent on His will and pleasure and unverifiable by the senses. The Protestant rejection of transubstantiation is largely based on ignorance of these facts. Again, the black magician who celebrates the Black Mass in the belief that by getting hold of the god in material form and inflicting obscene insults upon it, he can invoke the powers of Satan for his own advantage is wasting his time. He cannot possibly injure God; he can only degrade himself and lose his own soul. It is true that a priest treats the consecrated elements with the greatest care and respect and sees to it that they are not put to any use other than what is required sacramentally. From this it follows, that should some of the sacramental wine be inadvertently spilt or some crumbs of a consecrated host be dropped and eaten by mice, say, "nothing happens." To believe otherwise is to confuse magic and sacrament.

That, of course, is precisely what happens to the unfortunate

scrupulant who is worried to death lest a fragment of the host were caught up in a hollow tooth or entangled under a dental plate and subsequently fouled and dishonoured by the eggs and bacon partaken at breakfast. He is, as stated earlier in my talk, arrested at the level of magical feeling and thinking.

There is, however, a form of white magic directly connected with Catholic (and pagan) tradition and practice which perhaps should not be called white magic at all and which is best represented by sacramentals. A new term is needed to cover sacramental practices of all kinds—the blessing of holy water, the blessing of rosaries, medals and the like, the use of scapulars, etc.—in order to differentiate them from both magic and superstition. After much thought, I decided that the word "*helge*" might be usefully employed. Helge is the nordic root from which the English word "hallowing" is derived. In the Christian sense, to hallow means to set something aside so that it may contribute in time and space to the eternal Redemptive drama. It is clear that a saline solution which has been blessed remains salt and water, and nothing else; and yet, since holy water has been hallowed or set aside for a special purpose, it can exert preternatural, or even supernatural, influence when being used for specific purposes with proper dispositions, in virtue of the prayer that went into its hallowing. As in the case of the sacraments, the principle of the utilisation of the sensible sign is involved. Scrupulants get all hot and bothered about sacramentals as well: "Did I make the sign of the cross at exactly the right moment during the Asperges?" "Am I guilty of the sin of sacrilege because I dropped my rosary in the soup by mistake?" Although he does not realise it, for the scrupulant the priest is a white magician—not a practitioner of helge—weaving a lot of spells to ward off the onslaughts of dangerous demons and the wrath of an implacable deity. It might perhaps be wise to point out that countless uneducated Catholics who are not, strictly speaking, scrupulants hold and practise their religion partly at a magical level.

At this stage, it is necessary to distinguish magic from myth, and to define what is meant by a "true myth." In another place, I once said: "Nothing is truer than a myth." A myth is the powerful impression or paradigm of the divine exemplars. For various reasons, chief amongst which is the fact that myths exist outside the prison of causality, men cannot lead a healthy or creative



psychic life without a mythology to sustain it. I must assume that most of my audience are familiar with the conceptual framework of Jung's psychology, and that I can therefore say without obscurity that the *dramatis personae* of myths are *archetypes*. Whether one can accept the somewhat difficult notion of a Collective Unconscious as propounded by Jung (I, for one, can not, without modification), or not, it is undeniable that the human psyche has always constructed and will continue to construct images which remain substantially the same, however their mythological or semantic forms may change: the Hero, the Saviour, the Virgin-Mother, the God, the Puer Aeternus, the Philosopher's Stone, the Devouring Mother (the "White Goddess" of Robert Graves), the Angel, and innumerable others. The archetype, of course, pre-dates the mythological form subsequently given to it. Take the Angel-archetype, for instance: the archetypal essence consists of the idea of pure spirit unhampered by the categories of time and space. An "angel" therefore, whether we are dealing with the mythological trappings of Hermes, the messenger of the Gods, Lucifer, Son of the Morning, or Michael the Archangel, can go from A to B without the passage of time. Hermes accordingly wears winged sandals, and in Christian angelology these blessed or cursed spirits are represented as winged beings. The unique feature of Christian mythology—and we should never be afraid of using that term—is that it is ontologically and in a certain strict sense, historically, as well as mythologically, *true*: but its mythological truth is of immense importance for the human psyche. One of the tragic features of the Age of Enlightenment in which we live and struggle to move and have our being is that it possesses no acceptable mythology to enrich it and give it meaning. One of the most interesting features of Science-Fiction, so called, is its attempt—by no means always unsuccessful—to provide a mythology in modern dress. Its space-ships, with their "hyper-drive" exploiting hitherto unknown properties of space, enabling men to travel many times more swiftly than the speed of light, symbolise man's craving for the status of pure spirit, and his striving after the Beatific Vision.

Many complain—and, I think, with considerable justification—that our present-day Catholic-Christian mythology is petrified and half-dead. In my view, by and large, Christian art-forms

ceased to progress after the Renaissance. Those artists who try to give our mythology a contemporary form, such as the late Eric Gill or Tristram Hillier, say, are apt to be looked upon as dangerous innovators or potential heretics—dangerous innovators, like Leycester King, who tried to express the Christian truths to be found in modern psychiatry in contemporary idiom.

What has all this to do with obsessive-compulsive neurosis or scrupulosity? The point that I would like to make is that, to my way of thinking, the obsessive-compulsive neurotic, in so far as he is arrested at the magical level of thinking is trying to live out a *private* myth and, if he is a Catholic, is confusing it with Christian mythology.

That this is not a whim derived from theoretical speculation, reading of the works of Jung and his collaborators and armchair conversations with Jungian practitioners is confirmed by (necessarily very limited) personal experience with patients and by recent literature, especially the work of the American anthropologist-cum-psychotherapist, Dr. Kilton Stewart, whose recent popular work, *Pygmies and Dream Giants*,<sup>1</sup> is most inspiring. Kilton Stewart, an erstwhile Mormon missionary, is far from being a Catholic; but in the course of his study of so-called primitive peoples he would appear to have appreciated the importance for Western man of Christian mythology and even the transcendental verity of the Redemptive drama for the whole of humanity.

The psychotherapeutic procedure may be very painful and disturbing for the Catholic patient; for it is often necessary to rob him of his magically-held superstitions and beliefs, after forcing them to contribute their quota of power and value to something philogenetically more mature, which he can be helped to acquire in the later stages of treatment.

The earliest stages of treatment, often helpfully re-inforced by means of various hypnotic procedures, is almost at the shamanistic level: the patient, as with the primitive Negritos of Luzon, becomes his own shaman, has his own inspired visions and dreams. During this phase, the patient will evoke one after the other the hostile archetypal figures that possess him, compelling them to surrender their powers and attributes for his own constructive service. From that moment, they will cease to tyrannise over him, with their insatiable demands for propitiation and sacrifice. It

<sup>1</sup> *Pygmies and Dream Giants*, by Hilton Stewart, London, Gollancz, 1955.



seems to me that there are as many private myths as there are patients and that the Freudian analyst, with his sole reliance on the one myth which he regards as universal, the Oedipus-myth, is working in blinkers. If he were to be bold enough to travel the roads of life unblinkered, he would come across the sources of the Freudian myth itself, and be both marred and made by the experience.

It should now be clear why I hold the view that the Catholic priest, whose concern is with the soul of man rather than his psyche, cannot combine the roles of *sacerdos* and psychopomp: the shaman or witch-doctor, in addition to playing a part in the world of external reality, is himself an archetypal figure; and the same consideration applies to the Catholic priest. The priest should never allow himself to practise magic, apart from "helge," whereas it is the duty of the trained psychotherapist to utilise magic and be its master. The priest should take over where psychotherapy leaves off. Allow me to conclude this lecture with a brief quotation from the ex-Mormon missionary.

I, Western man, can examine the non-scientific groups and see where their therapy is better than my own, and why it is better. I can see how Western man has gained in the control of his environment as he discovered that the images and visions of his dreams were not the outside world, that they belonged to him rather than to the things which his mind had photographed. I can see how he has erred in failing to recognise that these emotionally charged images of things and people are, nevertheless, real things, things which both reveal and determine his inner state of being—the universe which he is himself.

I, Western branch of universal man, do not have to do what the earth, plant, animal, or sky spirits tell me to do in my dreams, or to make sacrifices to them. I profit by the sacrifice of the Jesus Christ, who accepted the knowledge of the Wise Men from the East (Magi!)<sup>1</sup> and the Shamans of Israel. I do not protect myself by giving way to, or compromising with, earth, sky, or ancestor-spirits, but relentlessly attack them. I profit by the religious tradition of breaking up the graven images of the authority of the past.

Judging from the papers, and the tone of the discussion at international congresses of Catholic psychiatrists and clinical psychologists, I have the impression that Catholic practitioners

<sup>1</sup> My inserted parenthesis.

in these fields are much more concerned with proving how right Freud was—less often, Jung or Adler—and how orthodox Catholics can remain whilst at the same time practising psychoanalysis. At one of these congresses, in the course of a discussion on a paper of that kind I blandly put the cat among the pigeons by speaking as follows: "I should like to thank Father — for his learned contribution, which has convinced me that one can make full use of the psychoanalytic method and accept at least ninety per cent of psychoanalytic doctrine, and remain an orthodox Catholic. Of what the Reverend Father has failed to convince me is that one can be so completely psychoanalytical and remain a reasonably good scientist."

It seems to me that the Catholic psychotherapist of the future, taking advantage of all that is best in age-old Catholic thought and tradition—not forgetting St. Thomas and St. Augustine—must break new ground, rather than slavishly follow the furrows ploughed by others.

It must be admitted, however, that the failure of the more orthodox forms of analytical psychotherapy to make much impression on obsessive-compulsive neurosis and severe phobic anxiety-states, and the counsels of prudence given by the present Holy Father in his allocution to such a Catholic congress in 1953, have produced a kind of psychotherapeutic nihilism in the minds of many Catholic psychiatrists.

L'Hermitte, a distinguished Catholic neurologist, for instance, advocates leucotomy for the treatment of obsessive-compulsive neurosis. All that leucotomy can do, if successful, is to render experience less vivid so that it becomes more tolerable, by causing the patient to step down one or two rungs on the ladder of psycho-social evolution.

However, I believe that Catholic psychotherapists could have something more constructive than that to offer and that Catholic pioneers in this exciting field, such as the man whose memory we are seeking to honour in this lecture, have a task to perform which they dare not shirk.

# ANTE-NUPTIAL AGREEMENTS IN CUSTODY SUITS

By

D. P. O'CONNELL

**R**ECENTLY *The Times*<sup>1</sup> reported an exchange of views between Lord Justice Denning and counsel in a custody suit in the Court of Appeal involving consideration of the father's ante-nuptial promise to have his children brought up Catholics. Lord Justice Denning asked: "How can you expect a man to be sincere if he is forced into it? You cannot marry unless you give an undertaking." What the learned Lord Justice ignored was the fact that an undertaking of this character is no more the product of duress than the promise of fidelity unto death which the law still in general terms upholds. The contract of marriage itself must be free to be valid. The motives underlying the entering into of the contract or the acceptance of conditions ancillary to it may be exceedingly strong in terms of affection, but by no stretch of the imagination can they be described as "force" sufficient to vitiate consent or destroy freedom of decision.

The purpose of this article, however, is not so much to point out the philosophical inadequacy of Lord Justice Denning's approach, typical as it may be of English courts dealing with the question, but to analyse the basis of the supposed rule of law that ante-nuptial promises are irrelevant in custody suits. The topic is interesting for its illustration of the shifting emphasis in our courts over the past century on the family tie. "By marriage," said Blackstone, "the husband and wife are one person in law; that is, the legal existence of the woman is suspended during marriage, or at least is incorporated into that of the husband." Mid-Victorian judges elevated this concept of legal unity into a theory of paternal despotism, or "paternal prepotency" as Mr. Justice Gavan Duffy

<sup>1</sup> 29 May 1954, p. 5, c. 7.

put it in a case before the High Court of Ireland in 1950, such as found expression in the celebrated and widely criticised *Agar Ellis Cases* (I & II)<sup>1</sup> in which reference was made to the father's "undoubted right as master of his own house, as king and ruler of his own family." Against this background was constructed the common law priority of the father to determine the form of education and the religion of his children. The father having once made this determination no court might intervene, even after his death, and even when the consequences of failing to do so might be the erection of a barrier between the children and their widowed mother. Such were the consequences of this rule that legislation was enacted in 1886 directing the court that upon the application of a mother for custody it might exercise its discretion having regard to "the wishes as well of the mother as of the father." This direction, together with the tendency of the Chancery Courts to give effect to the father's right only when the welfare of the child would be satisfied in so doing, served to mitigate the stringency of the common law principle. In an appeal from Northern Ireland in 1924 Viscount Cave stated the rule as follows:

On the question of the religion in which a young child is to be brought up, the wishes of the father of the child are to be considered; and if there is no other matter to be taken into account, then, according to the practice of our Courts the wishes of the father prevail. But that rule is subject to this condition, that the wishes of the father only prevail if they are not displaced by considerations relating to the welfare of the children themselves.

Referring to the Act of 1886, he pointed out that while less stress was placed on the father's wishes than formerly, "a sufficient case must be made out for going contrary to the father's wishes."<sup>2</sup>

This decision was followed by the enactment of the Guardianship of Infants Act, 1925, intended to crystallise the practice of the Chancery Courts. It has been re-enacted in New Zealand and most of the Australian States. The court is directed by it to have regard to the welfare of the infant as the first and paramount consideration and not to have regard to any superior claim of the father over the mother or vice versa. What exactly the effect of this Act has been on the competing claims of parents is a matter of some dispute. The English courts have stated that it merely enacted the rule in

<sup>1</sup> (1878) 10 Ch. D., 49.

<sup>2</sup> *Ward v. Lavery* (1925), A.C., 101.

the Chancery Courts, and if this is to be taken as a considered judgment it would follow that a "sufficient case" must still be made out for "going contrary to the father's wishes in the matter of the children's education," a view approved by the Supreme Court of Queensland which has stated that "it is not open to question that the father has the right to have his children brought up in any religious belief he may wish."

On the other hand, the High Court of Australia,<sup>1</sup> overruling the Full Court of Victoria, has held that the Act excludes in any approach to the decision of the question of the best custody for an infant any preliminary assumption that the claim of the father as such is superior to that of the mother. The parties are, initially, on a basis of absolute equality. But this does not imply that the welfare of the infant is made the sole and exclusive consideration, "elbowing out" all other considerations. When the children's welfare is relatively neutralised then relevant considerations, such as guilt or innocence in divorce, may operate to persuade the Court to prefer one or other parent. This view of the Act has been confirmed in the Court of Appeal of New Zealand.<sup>2</sup>

The question whether or not the ante-nuptial undertaking is or can ever be a relevant consideration has not been put directly in issue in any English or Dominion court. Virtually all the reported decisions are concerned with children who had already been substantially educated in one religion and might suffer from a change. There is thus little authority on the question of priority in the case of young children who have not yet had time to form an opinion and whose welfare is therefore indifferent (on the criteria adopted by the courts). It is usually urged by the respective parents that custody should as a matter of course, other things being equal, be given to the parent in whose religion the child is to be brought up, and it is therefore important that the court should decide which of them has the prior claim. Two "considerations" have normally competed in the decided cases for supremacy, the father's wishes and the mother's reliance on the father's ante-nuptial undertaking. It is true that in the case of very young children the courts will generally find that welfare will be better satisfied by a grant of custody to the mother, and it is therefore normally in the case of orphaned children, when paternal and maternal relatives rely

<sup>1</sup> *Lovell v. Lovell* (1950) 81 C.L.R., 513.

<sup>2</sup> *Otter v. Otter* (1951) N.Z.L.R., 739.



respectively on the rival parental claims, that the problem will arise.

The older cases that are regarded as having laid down the rule that ante-nuptial undertakings are irrelevant do not make impressive reading, and are of doubtful authority in the light of this interpretation of the Act of 1925. The first decision on the point refused recognition to the undertaking on the ground that an oral agreement made in consideration of marriage is not enforceable under the Statute of Frauds, and the suggestion was made that even if it was enforceable an attempt to do so might be "detrimental to the interests of the public."<sup>1</sup> Sectarianism was clearly the inarticulate major premise. Thereafter the concept of public policy was resorted to in order to deny recognition to any attempt by a father at abdication of his right to determine his children's education. While promises in consideration of marriage were in all other respects enforced by the courts as "most solemn engagements"—a matter relevant to criticism of Lord Justice Denning's point—undertakings about the children's education came to be regarded as less sacred than the paternal trust, and the fact that the mother had been induced to enter into marriage by those undertakings was regarded as immaterial in face of the father's absolute and unqualified rights. From time to time the rule was mitigated, as for example when the courts held that a father who had actually carried out his promise by permitting the child to be brought up a Protestant had abdicated his rights, but there was no tendency to treat the undertaking itself as relevant to the question of custody. In fact any liberalising tendency was virtually reversed in the unhappy decision in *Re Violet Nevin*,<sup>2</sup> in which the Court assumed the prerogative to decide what choice a father would have made had he foreseen events that would happen after his death, and decided in effect that he would have repudiated his ante-nuptial agreement. The courts generally contrived to avoid this sort of approach by employing the concept of welfare to confirm the upbringing of children in a religion in which they were substantially educated.

In *Re Collins*<sup>3</sup> in 1950 counsel argued that the court ought to consider any arrangement between the spouses for the upbringing of children. It was unnecessary, however, for the court to determine what, if any, weight should be attributed to the undertaking

<sup>1</sup> *Re Browne* (1852) 2 Ir. Ch. R., 151.

<sup>2</sup> (1891) 2 Ch., 299.

<sup>3</sup> (1950) 1 All. E. R., 1057.

because in other respects the welfare of the child was not neutralised. The most emphatic statement on ante-nuptial promises in recent times is that of the Supreme Court of New South Wales in *Rochfort v. Rochfort*,<sup>1</sup> where it was said that no importance was to be attached to them since they have no legal operation. In that case, also, the welfare of the children was not neutralised and the comments of the court were *obiter*. With these cases it is instructive to compare the decision of the Supreme Court of Ireland in 1950 in *The Matter of Tilson*<sup>2</sup> which at the time occasioned some interest. The father, who was a Protestant, had entered into a written undertaking in consideration of marriage that the children should be educated as Catholics. They were actually baptised as such and until the separation of the parties the father evidenced no intention to repudiate his promise. The wife applied for custody on the ground that she, as a Catholic, would be the more qualified parent to give effect to the agreement. The Act of 1925 does not operate in Ireland, and the principles to be applied were therefore those of the Chancery Courts before that date. It was held that the Constitution, which gives both parents a joint power in respect of the religious education of their children, could be employed to make the decision of the parents irrevocable.

The case is interesting for the view it took of the basis to the rule that ante-nuptial agreements are irrelevant. This rule was described by the minority judge as an "archaic law, and relic of barbarism . . . derived from another law—that of the serfdom of women which perished in England in the legislation of 1925." One might agree that, despite casual references to "public policy," the authorities on the question of ante-nuptial agreements can only be rationalised on the basis of the father's right to determine the religious education of his children. In one decision the court even went so far as to claim that its duty was "to see that the child is brought up in the religious faith of the father" in face of the father's contrary undertaking. If the Act of 1925 destroyed the father's rights and reduced his wishes to the status of a "relevant consideration," it undercut the logic of the decisions that ante-nuptial agreements are irrelevant. The effect of the Act on the common law might be argued to be analogous to the effect of the constitution of Ireland upon it, when *Tilson's Case* would be an authority. This is not to contend that effect should be given to the agreement as a

<sup>1</sup> (1944) 44 S. R. (N.S.W.) 238.

<sup>2</sup> (1951) I. R., I.



legal contract for which specific performance will lie, but it is to contend that the agreement, far from being irrelevant as it was before 1925, is a "relevant consideration" of persuasive value. Such is the view of the Full Court of Queensland which in 1936 held that "although a pre-nuptial contract is not a binding contract enforceable in a court, yet it is a circumstance to which weight, and perhaps great weight, should be given." In this case custody was given jointly to a maternal relative and a religious institution so that effect might be given to the undertaking. Comparison of the English approach may be made with that of the American, where practice was not conditioned by the unfavourable background of the *Agar Ellis Cases*. In some States the undertaking is treated as an integral part of the consortium. In Ohio it has been held that "as between the parties to this marital relation, when the wife was living the binding force and inviolability of this compact would be recognised by the courts." In Pennsylvania it has been held that the father's "stipulations entered into at the time of his marriage would have been a sufficient answer." The most emphatic pronouncements have come from New York where it has been held that "an ante-nuptial agreement providing for the Catholic faith and education of the children of the parties, in reliance upon which a Catholic has thereby irrevocably changed the status of the Catholic party is an enforceable contract having a valid consideration." This has recently been qualified in the case of a child aged twelve who had already been reared in another faith and did not want to change, a view that does no damage to the principle and which would commend itself to moral theologians.

The rather sweeping assumption to which Lord Justice Denning gave impatient expression that undertakings of the sort are of no significance might well be expected to retreat in face of the more liberal attitude that contemporary courts tend to exhibit. As divorce becomes more prevalent so do wrangles over custody, and it is a phenomenon by no means uncommon that the non-Catholic partner seeks to take his revenge on the Catholic by attacking the children's religion. His or her own conscience is rarely involved, and for the courts to continue to act on the view that they should be neutral between the parties in religion is in fact to perpetuate the myth that both parties have a religion. And in doing so they are, often enough, as practitioners will testify, giving effect to the basest of motives.

# HODIE

By

BARBARA ROCHFORD

STRANGELY remote my Christmas Greetings are:  
The stables in the snow  
With "far away" written on every star,  
And "long ago."

Cobwebs of ages hang about the Crib,  
And centuries of cold:  
The Maiden's miracle so hackneyed is—  
The Babe, so old!

And yet it is this evening, in this town  
Anxious she walks, in pain,  
And knocks, and asks for shelter to lie down—  
And asks in vain.

It is this evening, the tremendous thing!  
Come out, oh you to whom the angels sing—  
Come out and hear them where the bright bells ring!

Come out, Oh sons of kings, and see the white  
Shafts of the steeples leading down their light  
To where they hold their treasure in the night!

Come, for the midnight strikes, and it is morn,  
And priests at altars bow.  
It was not in the past that God was born—  
See, it is now.

# THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION

## *The Present State of the Evidence*

By  
JOHN L. RUSSELL

THE TERM Evolution has been used in many different ways since it was first brought into wide prominence by Charles Darwin nearly a hundred years ago. In a broad sense it can denote any continuous unfolding of some potentiality of a system, or any intrinsic tendency of a system to develop in a particular direction over a relatively long period of time. Thus we can talk about the evolution of the universe as a whole, or of the sun or the solar system. In its biological connotation it can refer to any process by which the descendants of a particular ancestor show a tendency to diverge progressively more and more widely from the ancestral type, but the "Theory of Evolution" is generally understood to mean the theory that all living organisms are descended from one, or a very few, original forms which are themselves presumed to have arisen ultimately from non-living matter. The theory, in its time, has been attacked and defended with a degree of violence and prejudice which has made it very difficult for the ordinary onlooker to come to any reliable conclusion. It may therefore be worth while to try to give a brief account of the kind of evidence on which the theory is based, and to suggest what seems to the writer to be a reasonable attitude to take to it. It must be understood, however, that much of the evidence is highly technical, so that its import cannot be adequately conveyed in non-technical terms. I shall attempt no more than a broad outline which may bring out a few of the more salient aspects of the problem. For a fuller treatment, the ordinary textbooks must be consulted.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The best general introduction, for readers with some previous knowledge of biology, is probably G. S. Carter's *Animal Evolution* (Sidgwick and Jackson).

It will be necessary to start with some general remarks on the principles of biological classification. Classification begins with an individual organism—say, Fido, our dog. He belongs to a particular race or variety (e.g., fox-terrier) of the Species: *Canis familiaris*. The species is included in the Genus: *Canis*, together with several other species such as the wolf (*Canis lupus*), and the jackal. The genus is included in a Family: the *Canidae*, together with other genera such as *Vulpes* (the fox). The family belongs to an Order: *Carnivora*, together with a number of other families, such as *Felidae* (cats), *Ursidae* (bears), etc. The *Carnivora*, together with some thirty other Orders (some of them extinct), are included in the Class: *Mammalia*. The mammals, birds, reptiles, amphibia and fishes are Classes belonging to the Sub-Phylum: *Vertebrata* of the Phylum: *Chordata*. Lastly, the Chordate phylum, together with about sixteen others (Arthropods, Echinoderms, Molluscs, etc.) constitute the Animal Kingdom. Plants are classified on similar lines.

The evidence for Evolution can be considered under two different aspects: firstly, the small-scale evolution of one species or one genus into another; secondly, large-scale evolution linking up one family with another, one order with another, and so on. These are frequently referred to as micro- and macro-evolution respectively. The evidence for micro-evolution is very strong, and in many cases is virtually conclusive. It comes from the study both of fossils and of living organisms, but the former is perhaps the more striking. In suitable geological formations, where sediments have been laid down uniformly over long periods of time, it is sometimes possible to follow a particular type of organism, such as a sea urchin or an oyster, through a continuous series of changes from an initial to a final form which are undoubtedly different species. Similarly, with relatively minor discontinuities, one genus can often be linked up with another, e.g., among the fossil horses and titanotheres.<sup>1</sup>

It is more difficult to establish the fact that evolution is still proceeding, since even a small evolutionary change requires a time which is long compared with a human lifetime. The evidence is mostly indirect and is not easy to summarise, since it is

<sup>1</sup> The geological evidence is discussed in more detail by A. S. Romer: *Man and the Vertebrates* (Pelican), and the historical background by P. G. Fothergill: *Historical Aspects of Organic Evolution* (Hollis and Carter).

based upon a multitude of complex genetical data, but some indication of its general nature can be given. The most important evidence is undoubtedly the well-established fact that when a given species exists as a series of isolated communities, with no exchange of population between one and another, the different groups will, almost invariably, tend to diverge from one another, and to become distinct races or sub-species. Almost certainly, if the isolation is maintained for a sufficient time, these develop into distinct species or even genera. A typical example is to be found in the freshwater lakes of Scandinavia. These came into existence at the end of the Ice-Age, about 20,000 years ago, with the melting of the ice which had previously covered the whole land surface. They were then colonised by what was presumably a single species of char—a fish which normally lives in the Arctic Ocean and comes up the rivers to spawn. With the retreat of the ice, the colonies became isolated from each other and from the sea. In consequence, each lake now has its own variety of char, which are classified into several species and numerous sub-species. Unless we are to suppose that each lake had a distinct variety specially created for it, we can hardly escape the conclusion that a measurable amount of evolution has occurred during the last few thousand years. Many similar examples could be quoted from other parts of the world.

The older arguments against the possibility of evolution were often based upon an incorrect notion of what is meant by a biological species. It has been supposed, for instance, that a species is always a perfectly definite, clearly circumscribed group, and that members of one species can never produce fertile hybrids when crossed with members of another. If these two propositions were universally true, then it would admittedly be difficult to see how evolution could ever transcend the limits of the species. In practice, most species can be clearly defined, and most hybrids between species are infertile, but there are sufficient exceptions to make it clear that no universal law can be laid down on the subject. There are, in the first place, two possible ways of defining a species, which do not always coincide with one another. The first is taxonomic; that is to say, it is based upon systematic differences in the form and structure of organisms. The second is ecological: a species is a group of organisms capable of living a full communal life together and freely inter-breeding. It is well



known that taxonomic classifications are frequently arbitrary; there are certain groups which are regarded by some experts as constituting a single species, and are divided by others into several. The ecological definition is superior when it can be used, since it considers the group as a living community, not simply as dead specimens on a dissecting table. Nevertheless, it also breaks down on occasion. For instance, the Herring Gull and the Lesser Black-Backed Gull occur together in Great Britain but do not inter-breed, yet in other parts of the Northern Hemisphere they are linked together by an almost continuous series of intermediate types. There are two "species" of Whirligig beetle—*Gyrinus natator* and *G. substriatus*—which in England will freely hybridise where their ranges overlap, but on the Continent will not. In Scotland the female capercailie will pair with the male blackcock or pheasant if no male of its own species is available, but not otherwise. In the first two of these examples we seem to be faced with a species which is on the point of dividing into two, but has not yet completed the process.

We cannot avoid the difficulties by defining a species as a group whose members, when they hybridise, produce fertile offspring. Hybrids between recognised species may (rarely) be completely fertile or they may have any degree of reduced fertility down to complete sterility, depending on the species concerned and, sometimes, on other factors as well. Complete sterility is the most usual, but by no means the invariable result. Among plants, it is sometimes possible, by using special methods of treatment, to produce completely fertile hybrids not only between different species but even between different genera, as for instance between wheat and rye, radish and cabbage, sugar-cane and bamboo. The products are in each case genuinely new species both in their morphological characters and in the fact that they will not normally hybridise with either parent. In certain cases new species of this sort are known to have occurred naturally: the *Spartina* grass which for more than fifty years has been spreading around the southern and eastern coasts of this country was the result of a natural cross between two other species of the same genus, which came into contact with each other for the first time on the Hampshire coast towards the end of the nineteenth century.

The evidence which has already been discussed, and much



more of the same sort which has not been mentioned, makes it virtually certain that micro-evolution has occurred throughout the past and is still occurring. Although its operation can only be positively identified in relatively few cases, there is no difficulty in supposing that it has operated universally in producing new species and genera within the limits of each family. The occurrence of macro-evolution is less easily established. Partly this is due to the slowness of the process, which makes it impossible to obtain any direct contemporary evidence of its workings. If the evolution of one species into another is to be measured in tens or even hundreds of thousands of years, the evolution of one family into another can hardly be expected to reveal itself within the span of human history. There is, however, a more serious difficulty arising from the unsatisfactory nature of the geological evidence. Although it is frequently possible to link up different species or genera by means of a series of intermediate fossil forms this is not so with the wider groupings. In no case is it possible to find a reasonably continuous series of transitional forms linking one order with another, and the same is true to a large extent of the families within an order. *A fortiori* it is true also of the classes and the phyla. This fact has been used by critics of evolution as strong evidence against the theory and it does undoubtedly constitute a difficulty which has not been fully resolved. It is not, however, quite so damaging as it might appear at first sight. For many reasons, gaps in the geological record are to be expected. In the first place, only a small proportion of the fossil-bearing rocks are actually exposed for our inspection at or near the surface of the earth. By far the greater proportion are hidden below hundreds or thousands of feet of overlying rock. Again, at any particular time, the conditions under which fossilisation can occur, or is likely to occur, will only be found in relatively restricted regions such as marshes, lakes or shallow seas: a great deal of evolution may occur in regions in which no fossils were ever produced or in which, if they were, they have been subsequently destroyed by erosion of the land surface.

It must be remembered also that, although the discontinuities between orders and classes are always striking, they are by no means absolute. In many cases, occasional intermediate types have been found. Thus the first known bird, *Archaeopteryx*, is, apart from its feathers and wings, more similar to a reptile in its

anatomical structure than to a modern bird. Similarly, there are fossils intermediate in many respects between fishes and amphibia, between amphibia and reptiles, and between reptiles and mammals. These always occur approximately (though not always exactly) at the time when the transition from the one class to the other should have taken place. For one reason or another, none of the fossils hitherto discovered, except perhaps *Archaeopteryx*, can be regarded as on the direct line of descent from one class to another, but they probably lie close to this line. At the least, they show that intermediate forms are biologically possible, and they give a general indication of the way in which the transition could have occurred.

Finally, the geological record supports the theory of evolution to the extent that, however inadequate it may be in certain respects, its general features are broadly what would be expected if the theory is true, and are difficult to explain on any other supposition. As we pass from earlier to later rocks, we find among the fossil organisms a continuous tendency towards increasing specialisation on the one hand, and increasing complexity on the other; the latter showing itself most characteristically, among the higher organisms, in an increasing independence of, or mastery of, their environment. Moreover, within any particular class of vertebrates, the earlier representatives of the different orders tend to resemble each other, and their supposed common ancestor, more closely than do the later members; the general pattern of change is that which would be expected if all had diverged from a common origin.

One fact which emerges from the geological record and helps to explain the gaps in it is that macro-evolution has not been a steady process, but tends to proceed in bursts. What happens typically is that at certain critical points a new structural modification is acquired by a particular organism, which enables it to colonise some new, hitherto vacant environment, or to exploit an existing environment in some new way. Once the crucial step has been taken, it is able to spread rapidly with no competition from pre-existing organisms. There are good reasons for supposing that these conditions will encourage an unusually high degree of variability; a great variety of new forms will be produced which will become adapted to different "ecological niches." Eventually the potentialities of the new environment

will have become fairly fully exploited, and then the rate of evolution slows down until some new major advance is achieved. Five critical steps of this sort can be traced in the history of the vertebrates, associated with the first appearance of fishes, amphibians, reptiles, birds and mammals respectively. On a smaller scale, the same sort of sequence of events may be associated with the origin of new orders and families. It is therefore reasonable to suppose that the earlier stages of any big evolutionary advance will be passed through more rapidly than the later ones, and that they will be correspondingly more poorly represented in the geological record. At the present time, the world seems to be in a quiescent period, so much so that some biologists, such as Dr. Julian Huxley, believe that macro-evolution is now complete, except that the human race is capable of further major evolution provided that man himself will take a hand in the process. But most biologists would doubt whether there is any good evidence for this view.

The most important evidence for macro-evolution is derived from comparative anatomy and physiology. It is found that all members of any particular phylum are built upon a substantially similar plan, and the similarity becomes progressively more exact among the members of the class, order and family. All vertebrates, for instance, have heart, liver, kidneys, red blood, brain and nervous system conforming to the same fundamental pattern; all have basically similar skeletons in which it can be said, with some qualifications, that each individual bone of any one vertebrate animal corresponds to, or is homologous with, some particular bone in every other. In many cases this remains true even when, in some particular species, the bone in question has ceased to fulfil any useful function; it may still occur in a vestigial state, presumably as an inheritance from some remote ancestor. Thus the rudimentary tail bones in man, and the legs of the python, appear to be genuinely vestigial structures with no value to their possessors. It should be added, however, that there is little evidence of any common structural plan as between the different phyla and no geological evidence of any linkage between them. It would therefore be quite plausible to suppose that some or all of them had evolved independently from distinct prototypes. As a working hypothesis, however, the theory of a single common origin for all phyla seems at present to be more satisfactory.

What should be the judgment of a reasonably detached critic on the theory of evolution? Has it been satisfactorily established or not? Before answering this question we must ask ourselves what sort of evidence we can reasonably require. We cannot hope to have the same sort of certainty of its truth as we can of propositions such as " $3 + 4 = 7$ ," or "Paris is the capital of France." In everyday life we accept without question innumerable beliefs which, although highly probable, cannot be proved with absolute certainty, and it would be foolish to refuse assent to evolution on the ground that some impossibly high criterion of verification had not yet been achieved. The question is then: what sort of confirmation can be obtained, and what degree of acceptance does this justify? The problem is complicated by the fact that evolution can be judged according to two different criteria: as history or as a scientific theory. The distinction is one of degree rather than of kind, but it is sufficiently important to deserve further consideration. The historian, judging of some past event, will look in the first place for direct evidence that it did or did not happen: archaeological remains, contemporary documents, and so on. The scientist on the other hand, when he propounds a theory, does not generally begin by asking: is this theory true in an absolute sense? What he wants to know is whether it is consistent with the known facts, whether it enables him to integrate and co-ordinate the phenomena into a single, simple, intelligible pattern; whether it suggests fruitful lines for future research or makes predictions which are subsequently verified; whether it is superior in these respects to any alternative theory which might be suggested. In so far as it fulfils these conditions it is a good theory. The distinction in method is by no means absolute. The historian must fall back on theory in order to fill in details, and especially in dealing with obscure or badly documented regions of his subject; the scientist can make many positive assertions of fact and he can also claim that a theory which fits the facts well has a real likelihood of being true in an absolute sense. Nevertheless it does correspond to a real difference of approach.

Now, judged by the standards of the historian, macro-evolution does not show up too well. The direct evidence that it has happened is scanty, and lets us down at a number of critical points. On the other hand, judged as a scientific theory, it comes through

with flying colours and is, indeed, indispensable to the biologist. It fulfils all the conditions of a good theory. It enables him to link up a vast range of diverse phenomena in geology, comparative anatomy and physiology, embryology, genetics and natural history. It has made predictions which have subsequently been verified, as for instance that there must be fossil organisms intermediate in structure between man and the apes, and between one class of vertebrate and another. It seems, moreover, in the present state of knowledge, to be the only theory which can serve any useful purpose. The only alternative seems to be Special Creation—the theory that each species or family, or whatever it may be, was specially created by God either out of nothing or, in some unknown but miraculous way, out of pre-existing matter. This is not, scientifically, a useful theory. Primarily, what the scientist asks of a theory is that it should enable him to understand why things happen in this way rather than that: to select from the infinite number of possible patterns of events just one, or a limited group, to which the actual events conform. Now the difficulty about Special Creation is that it is consistent with almost any conceivable pattern of events. We cannot see into God's Mind, or share His Counsels, or know why He chose to create in this way rather than that. It is only in so far as secondary causes are at work that we can hope to understand how and why things happen as they do. Thus we shall never, in this life, understand why God chose to create the universe at all, or why He gave it the properties He did, since no secondary causes were involved in the original act of creation.

The only limits we can impose upon the possible modes of creation are those arising from God's own Nature—in particular, from His Goodness and Veracity. We cannot suppose that He would "fake" His Creation in such a way as necessarily to lead us into error. Thus it would be quite unreasonable to suppose that the first man was created about 4,000 B.C. and that all the apparent relics of earlier men—Stonehenge, the Altamira Cave-paintings, the skeletons of Neanderthal Man, etc.—were directly created by God *in situ* without any human agency. Can we argue, in a similar way, that the pattern of evolutionary theory fits the known facts so well that it would savour of deception on God's part if in fact He had brought the different organic types into being by a series of special creations? As regards micro-



evolution I think we can. To suppose that each species has been separately created would be to make nonsense of the greater part of modern biology, and would suggest that the world is fundamentally deceptive and unintelligible. Most biologists would be inclined to say the same where macro-evolution is concerned, at least up to and including the common origin of all members of each phylum. And it is, undoubtedly, very difficult to understand why, for instance, God should have created even a few intermediate forms between one class and another at just about the time when the transition, on evolutionary theory, should have occurred or why forms intermediate in bodily structure between man and the apes should have been created shortly before man appeared on the earth. The Special Creationist can always reply that God is free to act as He pleases but, as we have seen, there is a limit to this line of defence.

Whatever may be the position at the present time, it is certain that the great majority of biologists will not be prepared to abandon the search for secondary causes unless and until it becomes clear that the quest is hopeless, and this is certainly not the case now. So long as the theory of evolution is the only available natural explanation of the biological history of the world it will continue to be accepted as a matter of course, both by Catholic and non-Catholic biologists.

Some writers of Christian Apologetics have suggested a compromise theory according to which macro-evolution has occurred, but not wholly as a result of natural causes. At some points God has intervened miraculously in order to help the process over otherwise unbridgeable gaps. Science, they say, will never be able to explain the major transitions: how, for instance, a bird could have evolved from a reptile. We must therefore suppose that these were the result of miracles. This sort of argument cannot, in the present state of knowledge, be positively refuted, but it is unlikely to commend itself to scientists. Biology is still in its infancy and we ought to be very cautious about setting limits to its possible future developments. It is true that the scientist cannot exclude, *a priori*, the possibility of miracles; there are, indeed, certain cases where, if he is honest and unprejudiced, he ought to admit that a miracle has occurred. But these are cases where the event in question has been actually observed and carefully described by reliable witnesses, where it clearly lies outside the



range of laws or properties of matter which are already adequately known, and where the general circumstances in which it occurred are such as to make it clear that a miracle has been intended. In order to prove that an event is miraculous, we need a detailed knowledge of it, and of the relevant laws of nature, which we have certainly not got about any of the important stages of evolution. It is the profession of the scientist to search for secondary causes and natural explanations; in the absence of positive evidence of miracle it would be mere defeatism for him to give up the search and to persuade himself that nobody will ever be able to explain whatever seems at the moment to be obscure or remarkable.

In point of fact, nothing that we know of miracles gives us any reason to suppose that God ever performs them simply in order to supplement a deficiency in the laws of nature. All known miracles seem to have been worked as signs, intended to manifest some particular aspect of God's dealings with men, with particular reference to the mysteries of the Incarnation and the Redemption. The scientist is entitled to assume that God, in the beginning, created the laws of nature in such a way that they would be adequate to produce all the effects of the natural order, and that we need only look for miracles within that realm in which the natural has been integrated into, and partially transcended by, the order of supernatural grace.

It may be objected to this, that at least the transition from an irrational animal to man must have been miraculous, since it involves the special creation of a spiritual soul: once this is granted the preceding argument falls to the ground and we might just as well admit a number of such miracles. There is, however, no real parity between the two cases. The production of a spiritual soul is something which lies essentially outside the operations of physical law. There is no question here of a mere supplementation of the law, or of producing a transition from one state of affairs in the purely physical order to another in the same order. The creation of the first human soul was an event outside the order of physical causation, but it was no more miraculous, in the strict sense of the term, than is the creation of any other human soul. It pertains to the ordinary Providence of God, so far as we know, that whenever matter is suitably disposed for the reception of a human soul, He will in fact produce a human being. One of the

more practical objections which can be raised against "miraculous" theories of evolution is that they tend to obscure the vital difference between the transition from brute animal to man on the one hand, and every other biological transition on the other.

Finally, the wisdom of basing a Christian Apologetic on any sort of miraculous evolution or Special Creation may be questioned from a more fundamental standpoint. Since the time of Galileo and Descartes in the early seventeenth century there has been a continual tendency among scientific thinkers—often perhaps unconscious but always pervasive—to suppose that the laws of nature have some sort of absolute intrinsic necessity, so that they could not have been other than they are. They are "brute forces," blind, inevitable, operating by their own power, indifferent to man and his aspirations, to beauty, goodness and truth. God's Providence, His presence in the universe, even His existence, are manifested to us not in the laws of nature but only in the exceptions to them. This is the burden of Paley's famous *Treatise on Natural Theology*: the ordinary laws of nature, being blind and purposeless cannot explain the wonders of the human eye or of innumerable other organic structures. Therefore these must have been produced by an Intelligent Creator. The argument might be summarised briefly but without caricature as: science cannot explain everything in nature: therefore God must exist, God is required in order to explain what cannot be explained by science. It is no wonder that a generation of Christians brought up on Paley should have felt that Darwin was cutting the ground from under their feet, or that many who accepted the new doctrines should have had their religious faith shaken or destroyed. This accounts for the storm of opposition aroused by the publication of *The Origin of Species*, and also for the fact that the reaction was more violent among Protestants than Catholics. Catholic Apologetics, although not at that time in any very flourishing condition, had not altogether lost touch with the older medieval view, according to which the existence and many of the attributes of God are manifested to us in the laws of nature no less than in the exceptions to the laws. We can prove with complete certainty the existence of an Omnipotent, Eternal, Necessary Being from the existence of matter and motion, both of which, like everything else, were created by Him, are conserved by Him, and are subject to His will in all things. Once this is clearly recognised,

the question whether or not the whole realm of physical nature was produced by purely natural laws becomes, from the theological point of view, unimportant. What is certain and important is that God intended, from all eternity, to create Man and to put him in this world as the crown of this particular order of creation, and that He took those means which He saw to be most suitable for the purpose. As time goes on, we may hope to see ever more clearly what those means were. We have no cause to be alarmed at the prospect that they may have been the ordinary laws of nature.

## THE BIBLE TODAY<sup>1</sup>

THERE is a striking quotation, so far unidentified, in the late Professor A. Nairne's fascinating *Every Man's Story of the Old Testament*, and it reinforces a plea for study and reflection if one is to get the full meaning out of the Bible. "The Bible is itself a literature, and it leads us into many various literatures, and into the society of scholars." *The Bible Today*, the first of the two works to be noticed, is an excellent commentary on that text, and here one meets with many of the foremost Biblical scholars in this country today. True, this is not strictly the first meeting, since a great part of the matter here assembled has already been published, in June of last year, in a special Bible Supplement issued by *The Times*. Now that the articles have been made into a book, it has been possible to print in full contributions that had to be shortened in the original form of issue. Even so, they remain, for the most part, short, even summary, accounts of matters that would require many volumes for their full development, and one cannot help missing some of the illustrations that brightened the pages of *The Times* edition, even though there are some excellent ones in the book that has just been published.

There are, in all, twenty-nine contributions, of which it may be said that nine deal with the Old Testament, nine with the New Testament, and the remainder with the English versions and some other topics such as Bible societies, the influence of the Bible in social history, and the Bible and Christian worship. Several of the best Old Testament

<sup>1</sup> *The Bible Today: Historical, Social and Literary Aspects of the Old and New Testaments described by Christian scholars.* (Published for *The Times* by Eyre and Spottiswoode 25s).

*Jesus in His Time*, by Daniel-Rops, translated by R. W. Millar (Eyre and Spottiswoode in association with Burns and Oates 30s).

articles, it may be thought, will make their appeal chiefly to those who already have some knowledge of the subjects discussed. Thus, Professor D. Winton Thomas, of Cambridge, who has already written at greater length in the volume on *Record and Revelation* (Oxford, 1938), now has rather less than five pages for discussing "The language of the Old Testament." It is ably done, and it is absolutely up to date, but it could scarcely be easy reading for the inexperienced. Again, Professor N. H. Snaith has only a fraction over eight pages for "The Old Testament World," in which to take in summarily the centuries from the end of the Early Bronze Age until the accession in 55 B.C. of Herod the Great's father, Antipater, as procurator of Judea. The facts are there, but they are packed together tightly, and some readers will turn with relief to the newly published English version of Abbot Ricciotti's *History of Israel*.

There follow two highly competent but compressed studies by Professor S. H. Hooke ("Archaeology and the Bible") and Professor B. J. Roberts ("The Old Testament Hebrew text"). Professor H. H. Rowley discusses the literary growth of the Old Testament, and other scholars write briefly on the Pentateuch, the Hebrew prophets, the writings, and the Apocrypha (which last of course here includes many books that are accepted as sacred and canonical by the Catholic Church).

The New Testament articles include two studies of Our Lord's ministry by Professor T. W. Manson, Mgr. Ronald Knox's character sketch of St. Paul, and Professor C. F. D. Moule's brief account of the formation of the New Testament canon, entitled: "The shaping of the New Testament."

The miscellaneous articles are, on the whole, among the more readable ones. There are competent histories of the major Protestant versions in English, of which the more interesting are Professor N. Sykes's "The Authorized Version of 1611" and Professor G. R. Driver's quite masterly essay "The Revised Version," which includes a well-balanced judgment on the American "Revised Standard Version" of 1952. Catholic versions are also noticed, more particularly under "English versions since 1611" by Fr. Sebastian Bullough, O.P., but it may be felt that less than justice is done to the Rheims New Testament of 1582, and the Douay Old Testament of 1609, which have exactly nineteen lines of type devoted to them, not a few of them being taken up with such comforting reflections as that "Tyndale and the Protestant exiles did not wait twenty-seven years before printing their work." Yet, as Dr. J. K. Mozley, the author of this article on "The English Bible before the Authorized Version," has already admitted, Tyndale did not issue a complete Bible. Further, Coverdale's Bible of 1535, as the work of one "having little knowledge of Greek or Hebrew" (p. 129), differed markedly in this respect from the masterpiece of

Gregory Martin, chief translator of the Catholic versions of 1582 and 1609. A hint might somewhere have been given of *The Part of Rheims in the Making of the English Bible*, which is the title of a work published in 1902 by the late Dr. J. G. Carleton, pointing to nearly three thousand passages in which the New Testaments of Rheims and of the makers of the Authorized Version are identical.

To turn from *The Bible To-day* to the book *Jesus in His Time* is to turn from the work of specialists to that of a highly gifted amateur, whose volume on Old Testament history, *Israel and the Ancient World*, was published in English in 1949. The present book was first issued as *Jésus en son Temps* in 1945, and there was a corrected edition in 1947, in which some, but not all, of the changes proposed by Père Pierre Benoit, O.P. (in *Revue Biblique*, 1947, pp. 143-45) were accepted by the author. The press-notices quoted on the dust-cover of this English edition suggest that some of the reviewers in their zeal to shower praise on the work have forgotten the many fine volumes on Our Lord's Life that already exist. To their credit the publishers do not make any exaggerated claims for the book. In the words of their advertisement the purpose of the book is: "To tell the story of Jesus, a Jew living in Palestine during the reign of Tiberius Caesar, a man who appeared to his fellows to be like other men, but who said he was the Son of God." This surely is the purpose of every *Life of Christ*, and it is, for one reviewer at least, difficult to find anything very special about the present excellent book. Within the past thirty years not less than four outstanding works, originally written in French, have been translated into English. They are *Jesus Christ* by Père L. de Grandmaison, S.J., *The Gospel of Jesus Christ* by Père M.-J. Lagrange, O.P., *The Life and Teaching of Jesus Christ* by Père J. Lebreton, S.J., and *Jesus Christ, His Life, His Teaching, and His Work* by Père F. Prat, S.J. Of these the first (de Grandmaison's great book) is not a *Life of Christ* so much as an apologetic work, the expansion of the writer's notable study "Jésus-Christ" in the *Dictionnaire apologétique de la Foi catholique*. The other three works contain, as might be expected, a good deal of background material, and the usual informal commentary on the events and sayings recorded in the Gospels.

M. Daniel-Rops' volume resembles its forerunners in most ways. There is an introductory section on the manner in which the knowledge of Jesus Our Lord was handed down to us, and this includes pages on the Canon of Scripture, the text of the Gospels, and the content of the individual Gospels. The main work is divided between twelve chapters, of which the first is concerned with the mission and message of St. John the Baptist, and the second with the history of the sacred infancy. Chapter iii is a "background" study of life and conditions in Palestine. Chapters iv and v deal with the public ministry from the temptation



in the desert to the Transfiguration and the first warnings about the Passion. Chapter vi ("Son of Man, Son of God") is a study, largely psychological, of Christ's personality and character. Chapter vii ("The Seed falls upon stony ground") takes the Gospel narrative from the departure from Galilee to the anointing at Bethany. Chapter viii ("The Sign of Contradiction") stresses the complete originality of Our Lord's teaching, the conflict between the Gospel and the forces of Judaism and paganism, and the Cross as the supreme "sign of contradiction." Finally, chapters ix-xii offer us detailed and impressive studies of the last days of the public ministry, the arrest, passion, and death of Our Divine Saviour, and His victory over the grave through His resurrection.

In marked contrast with the French edition, the English version is well printed, well indexed, and handsomely bound. It is quite an adequate rendering of the original, in spite of many small slips, and of the translator's inability to find some fixed principle for converting the metric system. Occasionally, as on p. 168, last sentence of paragraph 1, there is flagrant mistranslation. (Cp. p. 210 of *Jésus en son Temps*, 1947 ed.)

JOHN M. T. BARTON

## GRAMOPHONE NOTES

GABRIELE D'ANNUNZIO (a proud pseudonym for a much less high-sounding name, Giacomo Rapagnetta) that arrogant poet-politician of the early years of this century, hurling defiance to armed power from his rocky fortress, writing prose and poetry shaped to jewelled perfection, the "protector," and more, of the great Eleanora Duse, is now already largely forgotten. If he is not completely so, it is because of his collaboration with Debussy in a mystery-play called *The Martyrdom of St. Sebastien*, last seen in London, I believe, when Ida Rubinstein danced, or pranced, her way through it, and showed a yoga-like imperviousness to hot coals and arrows (admittedly suspect). The music of this spectacle, which now appears on a Decca record, is called "incidental," but never was there a greater understatement. From the very beginning Debussy's extraordinary evocative powers take charge of, and transmute into pure gold, the dramatic situations, and give them a concreteness that the words fail to do. The conductor is Ansermet and he extracts all the magic from the score. I should like to couple with this record the playing of Sets 1 and 2 of Debussy's *Images* (Ducretet-Thomson, a Decca label) by Albert Ferber. This is some of the most beautiful Debussy playing I have ever heard (and I am not



forgetting the beauty of Giesecking's playing of this composer's piano music). There is never any impressionistic "mush" but a clarity that is at the same time sensitive to every subtle shade of colour in harmony or figuration. Lovely, too, is the playing of the two Fauré cello sonatas, Op. 109 in D minor and Op. 117 in G minor, by a French duo, Monique and Guy Fallot (Ducretet-Thomson). In his chamber music, Fauré so often does what are considered to be "wrong" things, the solo instrument has very few rests, the piano figuration repeats itself endlessly, often with notes of equal value, and the texture remains unvaried for long stretches. But this deliberate avoidance of excitement, this insistence on the lyrical idea and its framework, gives the music its almost hypnotic charm. The secret in listening to this music is not to resist its supposed monotony, but to accept it: it then flowers into a new experience.

Earlier French music to be strongly recommended are the two records (L'Oiseau Lyre) of Six Sonatas for Violin and Continuo by Jean-Marie Leclair, played by Isabelle Nef and Georges Alès. Leclair, called the Elder to distinguish him from a younger composer of the same names, was born in 1697 and died in 1764, and thus overlapped Bach by about ten years. His style is richly varied, strong and poignant by turns, and we can be grateful to Mrs. Hanson-Dyer, who directs L'Oiseau Lyre, that we can begin to see such little-known figures in seventeenth and eighteenth century music as more important than history books allow. For hitherto we knew these minor figures by at the most one or two published works: in bulk, as given in these records, we see their real stature. The same is true of a composer like Torelli (1658-1708): with the issue of his Twelve Concerti Grossi on two records we can for the first time see what an important figure he was, influencing Albinoni, Vivaldi and Bach. Louis Kaufman, who directs the first-rate playing, uses the original 1709 edition of Torelli's Concerti. Also issued by L'Oiseau Lyre are Couperin's *Motet de Sainte-Suzanne* (conducted by Anthony Lewis), a beautiful example of the composer's vocal music, and Rameau's *Six Concerts en Sextuor*. The pieces here are known chiefly as harpsichord works, but the arrangements are contemporary and possibly by Rameau himself. Ruggiero Gerlin plays the keyboard music of Bach and his sons on a L'Oiseau Lyre record. C.P.E. is somewhat long-winded, although the ideas are delicious, but the record is worth having for the W.F. fugues, etc. How imaginatively wayward they are! The pieces by Bach père are curiously chosen. A companion record is *Masters of English Keyboard Music*: Byrd and Tomkins, played by Thurston Dart (O.L.). Tomkins is revealed as a big figure. Moving forward nearly 400 years, through the broken history of English music we come to Britten's opera *The Turn of the Screw*, issued on two records by Decca, in a fine performance con-

ducted by the composer. We here see the keyboard used as an integral, and vitally effective, part of a small-orchestral ensemble. Apart from *Peter Grimes* this is undoubtedly Britten's most integrated work: even without the stage the full horror of the situation is uncannily conveyed. The only question is whether it fulfils a constructive purpose in one's experience.

Schubert is beautifully represented in new issues. Gerard Souzay and Dalton Baldwin give a recital (No. 2) of songs, and one listens entranced to the wonderful flow of vocal sounds, the effortless control and above all the musicianship. *Du bist die Ruh* is unforgettable. The accompanist is discreet and musicianly but not always in complete unity regarding ensemble. The Piano Trio in E flat is performed by players (possibly Danish) unknown to me, but they give an impeccable performance, albeit somewhat rigid and frigid. The opening of the slow movement seems particularly mechanical and unromantic. Dvorak's 'cello concerto was recently issued in a performance by Fournier, and in previous Gramophone Notes I commented on this as not being quite strong enough playing for the music. Decca has now issued a performance by Navarra, with Schwarz conducting. Here is someone who combines Fournier's sensibility with a more masculine strength, and the result is a noble record. Rachmaninoff's hoary C minor Concerto (No. 2) also receives a masterly performance by Leonard Pennario with an American orchestra. There is however still much to be done on the technical side of record-making: for in concertos generally the sound of the solo instrument is so much better than the orchestral sound.

For the Bruckner enthusiast there is a new and lovely recording of his Mass in E minor (written in 1869) by the choir and orchestra of the Hamburg State Opera, and the "Romantic" Symphony, No. 4 in E flat major, played by the Vienna Philharmonic (Decca, two records) with Wagner's *Siegfried Idyll*, unbuoyantly played, as a fill-up on the fourth side. The Musica-Vitalis Quartet (a Danish ensemble) play Nielsen's second quartet, Op. 9, with a more modern work, Vagn Holmboe's second quartet, on the reverse side (Decca). Nielsen's is an earlyish work, with a first movement that does not come up to the splendid remaining movements: but how superior it is to Holmboe's self-conscious modernities!

Finally, a curiosity. A record headed "Percussion" (Decca) contains works by Milhaud, Chavez and Bartok. The first is trivial, but the second, a Toccata in three movements for percussion only, is first-rate. The composer has complete control of what could so easily degenerate into a primitive orgy. For this work alone the record is worth buying.

EDMUND RUBBRA

## REVIEWS

### MYTH AND RELIGION

*The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms: Volume II; Mythical Thought*, by Ernst Cassirer, translated by Ralph Manheim (Yale University Press: London, Geoffrey Cumberlege 40s).

THE FIRST VOLUME of Professor Cassirer's *Philosophy of Symbolic Forms* was reviewed in THE MONTH for March 1955. It was there stated that Cassirer "sought to prepare the way for a systematic philosophy of human culture by a study of the forms through which human consciousness transforms the world of received impressions into a world that is the expression of the human spirit." Now, it was Cassirer's conviction that the specific cultural forms emerged from "the universality and indifference of the mythical consciousness" as a primal source. And, given this conviction, the study of the mythical consciousness obviously becomes of great importance. Hence the present volume which was originally published in German in 1925.

The matter contained in the book is, of course, systematically arranged. There are four parts, which deal respectively with myth as a form of thought, myth as a form of intuition, myth as a life form, and the dialectic of the mythical consciousness. But there are references to a very considerable literature and discussions of a variety of theories about the nature of myth; and it is perhaps easier to understand what Cassirer does not accept than to grasp the precise nature of his own interpretation of the data. A prospective student of this rather difficult volume would probably be well advised to read first the chapter on myth and religion in Cassirer's *Essay on Man*.

This volume is entitled *Mythical Thought* (or, as the wrapper puts it, perhaps more accurately, *Mythical Thinking, Das mythische Denken*). But Cassirer believed that the judging and interpreting performed by the mythical consciousness follow a mythical mode of perceiving the world. The mythical consciousness perceives the world in a special way, as a dramatic world of conflicting forces, powers and actions, each surrounded with an atmosphere of emotion. Things are friendly or hostile, fascinating or repellent. And the empirical differences between things are overshadowed by a feeling of the solidarity of life. For instance, men and animals are but parts of this unity of life, and the reality of death is denied. For the mythical consciousness it is not immortality which needs to be proved, as is the case with philosophic thought. Cassirer did not deny that primitive men were capable of noting the empirical differences between things; they were obviously

capable of this. But, as far as the mythical consciousness is concerned, he lays great stress on the feeling of solidarity and unity. This means, for instance, that he rejects the view that man clothed external objects with properties and attributes of which he was first conscious in himself, in his soul. The distinct consciousness of the self and its attributes presupposes a kind of undifferentiated consciousness for which there are no sharp distinctions. This consciousness is *sui generis*. It still lingers; and Cassirer thought that it had taken a new lease of life, as it were, in modern totalitarianism. But the scientific outlook is opposed to it. Hence myth should not be regarded as a primitive form of science. In the history of philosophy and science we can certainly observe the prolongation and survival of mythical elements; but this empirical mingling should not blind us to the specific character of the mythical consciousness.

As for the relation between myth and religion, Cassirer refused to allow that we can fix any point at which myth ends and religion begins. Myth is from the start potential religion, and religion, even in its highest forms, is penetrated with mythical elements. "It is a fundamental trait in mythical thinking that wherever it posits a definite relation between two members it transforms this relation into an identity." In mysticism we see this tendency at work in spiritualised and developed religion, even though theology and the philosophy of religion regard the unity between man and God as a unity of different entities. All through his account of the development of myth and religion Cassirer prefers to emphasise continuity rather than, as Bergson did, discontinuity.

Apart from any detailed objections which might be brought against Cassirer's views (and these are bound to be numerous, since he deals with such vast material), the question which springs naturally to one's mind is, what did he think of the objective reference of the religious consciousness. To this question, however, he gives no clear answer. Although he insists that the mythical and religious consciousness is characterised by belief, and not by mere fancy, he restricts himself, according to his Neo-Kantian programme, with studying the "forms" of mythical and religious thinking and abstains from existential judgments about God. For Cassirer religion is one of the ways in which man creates a symbolic and ideal world, interpreting and organising his experience. It is not the only way. Nor is science. Nor is art. Cassirer does not simply reject religion in the name of science. Yet each mode of expression of the human spirit is a way in which man, by building up an ideal world, discovers himself; each symbolic world is an autonomous creation of the human spirit. Cassirer would not deny the reality of God; but it seems that "reality" would mean here reality in and for the religious consciousness. If Cassirer were willing to say

that God exists, I do not think that he would mean by this all that Aquinas meant.

*The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms* is doubtless a major achievement. But it does not seem to me to do more than to provide material towards a solution of the problem of man. In a sense, of course, this is not a valid objection against the work. For Cassirer did not pretend to do more than provide prolegomena for a philosophy of culture. And he certainly emphasised important points. He saw, for instance, that man cannot be understood without reference to religion. But the question is whether Neo-Kantianism can provide an adequate framework for the understanding of human culture, and so of man. I do not think that it can. But Cassirer was, of course, a man of learning and intelligence. And such a man has certainly something of value to say, even if his philosophy is inadequate to fulfil the aim which he sets before himself.

FREDERICK C. COPLESTON

### THE 'PSYCHOLOGICAL' NOVEL

*The Psychological Novel*, by Leon Edel (Hart-Davies 9s 6d).

IN THIS SHORT STUDY of a large and ill-defined subject Dr. Edel gives some account of the Jamesian "Point of View," and of the Internal Monologue as used by Dorothy Richardson, Joyce, and Virginia Woolf. Techniques for conveying psychological time are expounded through the work of Joyce, Faulkner and Proust. There are interesting chapters on "The Novel as Autobiography" and "The Novel as Poem." Contrary to our expectations, little is said about the relationship of the novel to contemporary schools of psychology.

The selective method by which Dr. Edel concentrates on a handful of novelists is typical of modern criticism, in which the great are shown in a vacuum. Thus even Conrad is not mentioned, though he was a finer technician of the "Point of View" than even James himself. D. H. Lawrence, the most important English novelist to come anywhere near Freud and Jung, is not even in the Index; yet he has, also, as great a claim as Virginia Woolf to be considered as a creator of the "poetic novel." The illustrations from Dorothy Richardson are not illuminating and show no technical advance on the "free-indirect style" of Flaubert. The few pages devoted to Faulkner give a feeble idea of this Nobel Prize winner. If his "masterpiece" *The Sound and the Fury* is only "a bold sally into the consciousness of an idiot," as Dr. Edel puts it, then it is as much a *reductio ad absurdum* of the Jamesian point of view as the dog's-eye view of Mrs. Woolf's *Flush*. Such has been the fate of the most vital techniques invented in modern fiction. They are still waiting to be used as logical methods in a larger design, rather than as ends in themselves.



Dr. Edel over-states the relationship between fiction and autobiography. Of course fiction must be clothed with all the detail of sensual, imaginative or spiritual experience and there is no book without an author. But the term "autobiographical" is unscientific. The pursuit of biographical trivia or what some fancy to be "the writer's mind" is not a critical task. If the critic's concern is primarily with the work of art itself, in both its technical quality and the quality of life that it reflects, Dr. Edel's book is chiefly deficient in the second respect.

FRANCIS SCARFE

### LOST GENERATION

*The Whispering Gallery*, by John Lehmann (Longmans 21s).

THE EXPRESSION "the Lost Generation" has been used to refer to those who were killed in the First World War. It could, however, be applied, one cannot help thinking after reading this book and others dealing with the same period from the same angle, with a slightly different meaning but with equal aptness, to the generation which immediately followed it. It was that generation—those who were still too young to fight when the war ended—with their guilt-complexes and torturing self-appraisals who have an even better claim to the sympathy and pity of their successors. Have we not Christopher Isherwood's disturbing account in *Lions and Shadows* of his obsession with "The Test," whereby he sought, agonisingly, to remove an imagined slight upon his manhood? And now Mr. John Lehmann reveals himself as having been a no less unhappy soul belonging to the same fateful period. His case indeed was further complicated by his having been brought up in an upper-class environment but in a politically radical atmosphere. There were therefore warring elements in him from the start which he found it everlastingly difficult to reconcile. In one passage he describes how, in the late 'thirties, he visited the office of some semi-Communist organisation in Paris in order to offer his services as an anti-Fascist worker.

I tried [he writes] to persuade the dishevelled, over-burdened political workers as they struggled with bursting files, broken-down typewriters and a dozen different languages . . . of the sincerity and ardour of my wish to help. I doubt if they quite knew how to take this strange animal from unpredictable England . . . a poet talking enthusiastically in unidiomatic French of revolutionary English poets they had never heard of . . . an Old Etonian with public-school manners and a copy of *L'Humanité* in his pocket.

This congenital dichotomy was, one feels, something in the nature of a permanent tribulation. Furthermore we read of attacks of what is



referred to as "rentier-guilt"; he and his friends were "deeply suspicious of Whitehall"; as a poet he found the "paraphernalia of dynamos, trains and tractors refreshingly alive as compared with the old poetic tinsel." Such was the gospel, and Mr. W. H. Auden was its prophet. In all of which it might be said that we are re-covering familiar ground. Too familiar, indeed, if that were all that the book contained. That, however, fortunately is not quite all. There is a poetic evocation of Eton to add to the number of notable tributes to that ancient foundation which have lately been appearing; there is an account of the running of the Hogarth Press, of which for a time the author was manager, and there is also an account of the founding and maintenance of *New Writing*, his own single-handed achievement. But all in all, as a personal record, the book leaves the reader with an uneasy impression of unhappiness and frustration. Mr. Lehmann belongs, after all, to those—and he quotes the lines—of whom Keats wrote,

To whom the miseries of the world  
Are misery, and will not let them rest.

Theirs is a noble company, without doubt; but the miseries of the world are a heavy burden and only those of quite exceptional spiritual strength are capable of bearing it.

JOHN MCEWEN

### REALITY AND ILLUSION

*Back to Reality*, by Gustave Thibon (Hollis and Carter 13s 6d).

*The Illusion of the Epoch*, by H. B. Acton (Cohen and West 18s).

GUSTAVE THIBON has written an important book. "Let us be frank about it," he says, "until we have constructed a society in which the individual is completely welded to his work by a system of sanctions and rewards that are *immediate and personal*, we must not be astonished that the moral sense is so often eclipsed. An appeal to the civic virtues may very well lead to sporadic results, but it will never serve as a substitute, so far as the majority is concerned, for the irresistible pressure of necessity." While the author recognises that "a material return to the land is neither possible nor desirable for all," he insists on the necessity of "the creation of a social order in which each feels *vitally* bound to his task, just as the countryman is to his."

The chapter "Christianity and the Democratic Mystique" is especially worthy of commendation; for it is not always realised that Communist messianism is an offshoot of democratic messianism or that "the paradise dreamed of by messianic democracy is . . . altogether earthly, made to the measurement of carnal and fallen man." Whether the revolutionary be a democratic Fabian or a Communist, "the revolu-

tionary fever lives on the refusal to accept the status of a creature." More often than not "the revolutionary . . . preaches social revolution because he is incapable of personal revolution . . . the revolutionary fever rises in a degraded soul like a bogus substitute for an impossible conversion."

This book is no less timely for the British than for the French readers for whom it was written. For there are also British Catholics who regard National Insurance as a substitute for Christian charity, and for whom "the evangelical counsels resolve themselves into purely administrative problems." Indeed, it might well have been Britain M. Thibon had in mind when he said: "There is no society more sick than one in which the softness of institutions adds its corrupting influence to the ravages due to the decline of individual love." *Back to Reality* is pregnant with wisdom and deserves a wide circulation. It is hoped that this rather expensive edition will be followed by a popular, paper-backed, Penguin-type edition.

"The alleged goal of the Marxist," remarks Professor Acton, "is a society in which there is administration without law, planning without miscalculation, direction without domination, high productivity without property or toil, and, it would seem, unrepressed men who nevertheless have left the condition of animal existence behind them . . . The scientific part of Marxism concerns the methods by which the Communist Party maintains itself and aims to spread its power, and here Marxism and *Realpolitik* go hand in hand." Marxism, in fact, is "a philosophical farrago."

If Marxism nevertheless continues to attract our contemporaries, it is surely because, as Professor Acton justly observes, "positivism is the orthodoxy of a technological age, and the positivistic component of Marxism is sufficient to recommend it to a very wide public." But since Communism is a religion as well as a philosophy, its devotees, who shrink instinctively from literature likely to subvert their faith, are unlikely to read Professor Acton. For the more highly literate, however, of those already disillusioned of Soviet Communism but who, like Tito, continue to revere the Marx-Engels-Lenin trinity, *The Illusion of the Epoch* may prove a valuable disinfectant.

It is as deplorable as surprising that an author so well-informed about Marxism should accept the myth that it was the lack of "the will and energy to struggle valiantly" that resulted in the "defeat of the highly armed forces of Chiang Kai-shek by the Chinese Communists." The truth is that the Chinese Nationalists, even although starved of arms and ammunition by their Western allies, caused more casualties among their indeed "highly armed" Communist opponents than the total suffered by all three of the United States forces in the course of World War II.

HAMISH FRASER

## THE GOSPELS FOR SCHOOLS

*The Gospel according to St. Mark*, with an Introduction and Commentary by C. C. Martindale, S.J. (Longmans 7s 6d).

THIS is the first volume of Longmans' *Stonyhurst Scripture Manuals* which will replace the same publisher's *Scripture Manuals for Catholic Schools*, now out of print. It is intended especially for those entering for public examinations; hence the choice of the Douay version, the insertion of examination questions, the maps and plans, the seventeen pages of the Introduction and the commentary throughout, all most helpful in rendering the study of this gospel both intelligent and religious. As in all such manuals, the commentary is longer than the text, and, as is less usual, is printed in larger type. Its declared aim is to bring out the full meaning of the text and throw light on the conditions in which Our Lord lived and spoke. These notes abound in graphic touches, arrest attention by revealing new significances and bring a wonderful freshness to what is staled to many of us by thoughtless familiarity; they review parallels and contrasts with other gospels to enrich understanding and to harmonise felt inconsistencies; in frequent applications they illustrate principles of Catholic criticism—a boon to the intelligent student for solving his own problems or meeting modern objections. The style of writing is not always easy; parenthesis, qualification and turn of sentence achieve completeness and exactness but sometimes lessen lucidity. Nevertheless, the book is excellent for its purpose; it puts Fr. Martindale's scholarship at the service of the schools and will delight many who have long left school. The publishers too have made it attractive for its printing, binding and cover design.

CHARLES SOMERVILLE

## CORNISH MIRACLE PLAYS AND THE TUDOR STAGE

*The Legend of the Rood*, translated, with Introduction by F. E. Halliday (Gerald Duckworth 8s 6d).

MR. HALLIDAY HAS EXTRACTED scenes from the three cycles of Cornish miracle plays so as to form one aesthetic and dramatic whole of "The Legend of the Rood": the story of the Cross from the creation of the world to the harrowing of hell. The translations are in English verse taken from the originals of the great Cornish scholar, Mr. R. Morton Nance. Some of the scenes are full of tenderness and high poetry, notably the first and last; but the interlude of the death of Pilate is blasphemously horrible. With the Reformation the Cornish miracle plays suffered even more than the English; not only were

religious manifestations suppressed but the country was commercialised and the language perished. Only the interlude or *guary* survived, played in gentlemen's houses by wandering clerks; and in Richard Carew's time (1600) these had degenerated into contemptible buffoonery. (At Francis Tregian's trial in 1577, the chief witness against him was one Twigge, player of a "bald interlude," who had lodged at his house.)

But if the plays perished from memory, the medieval theatres remained; and there are five of these great open-air rings in Cornwall compared with only one in England. These form the main theme of Mr. Halliday's very pleasantly informative introduction. They arose in the later middle ages when the plays became too popular for the churches to hold them, and were rather like "Ancient British" camps but with the orientation of a church. The circumference was a great rampart of seven tiers or steps where the audience stood or sat, the whole of the interior being reserved for the players and their tents and scaffolds. A very interesting feature was a trench or tunnel from the circumference to the centre which enabled actors—for example, Adam and Eve before their creation—to appear suddenly in the middle of the auditorium.

Mr. Halliday initiates the suggestion that these medieval rounds, rather than the Tudor innyard, were the matrix of the Elizabethan public stage which began with the *Theatre* and culminated in the famous "Wooden 'O'" of the *Globe*. An important piece of evidence, if it is correct, is that the early Elizabethan "groundlings" did not stand in the yard but round the edges of it, roped off like the audience in a Cornish mediaeval theatre; the whole of the interior would thus be reserved for the players' activities at the centre of which was the stage proper. Experts will doubtless wrangle over this fresh bone of contention. Mr. Halliday puts it forward modestly in a book which contains much else of interest.

CHRISTOPHER DEVLIN

## SHORTER NOTICES

*Fr. Vincent McNabb, O.P.*, by Fr. Ferdinand Valentine, O.P. (Burns and Oates 21s).

THIS IS A DIFFICULT BOOK to review, since both the author and Fr. Hilary Carpenter, in his Foreword, agree that it is not, strictly, a "biography," but rather, materials for one, including as it does letters, comments from friends, prayers and verses, down to analyses of Fr. Vincent's handwriting. It is a "Portrait," though an unfinished

one and maybe the more expressive for that. Fr. Vincent was often called enigmatic. He was assuredly filled with that mystery which they call vital force, nervous energy, and electrical driving-power—none of which explains anything, but which was the more astonishing since his childhood had been so frail; and he was so often sick, and despite the extreme rigour with which he treated himself, even apart from an apostolic activity enough to exhaust the strongest man. We are then tempted to rush to the opposite extreme, and put the fire of his zeal directly down to the supernatural impetus of grace. And we shall be right, provided we recall—and Fr. Ferdinand takes care that we shall do so—that grace had a hard fight for it and that the battle lasted maybe to the end. To have shown this with full candour is the essential merit of this book. Fr. Vincent's love for his family was deep: possibly the author is too preoccupied with disentangling the hereditary strains in him. But this family-history has its value because it reveals the depth and warmth of love which was in him when even to his confrères he might seem harsh, arrogant; savage towards those who differed from him and even vindictive afterwards. This seeming self-assurance co-existed with a real fear for his own "value" and indeed salvation. All this was visible during his terms as Prior of Hawkesyard, but even more at Leicester, where his personality made him a public figure, especially when he was, inaccurately, held to be socialist. When he became friends with Belloc and Chesterton he certainly became a distributist, and we venture to regret that he became obsessed with that (or any) *system*. No wonder the condition of the very poor horrified him and that the insane misuse of great wealth angered him; but neither distributism nor any other system could last save as the result of a national, indeed universal, change of heart; and, to our mind, the general demand for increased wages (and any increase is accompanied *pari passu* by rise in costs which stultifies it) shows that the change of heart has not happened. We cannot see that the leaders of any part of the world are determined that it should be *Christianised*, nor do those whom they "manage" insist on Christian government. So, as Belloc and Chesterton frankly acknowledge, Fr. Vincent, like almost any other truly great man, remains practically unknown; his experiments in social transformation have failed, but what they both saw was his holiness. Perhaps even they did not realise the interior struggle here portrayed: self-obliteration versus self-dramatisation (he was concerned even with the shape and decoration of his coffin): high intelligence at times leading by way of idealism to illogical action and eccentricities. Space forbids us to add more than that here was a man who could say with truth, "Lord, Thou knowest that I love Thee." And no man can so love Our Lord without being greatly beloved by Him.



*Thomas à Kempis: The Imitation of Christ*, a new translation by Edgar Daplyn, F.R.S.L. (Sheed and Ward 6s).

FIFTY YEARS of almost daily use of the Latin text of à Kempis and familiarity with Dr. Pusey's translation as well as the Cambridge rendering, based on the 1620 English version, made one sceptical of a new translation, even "the full text of the autograph MSS. of A.D. 1441 translated into modern English." However, the claims made in the translator's admirable preface are fully justified. It is in every sense a pleasure to read this version, for it is clear, living and satisfying English to read while waiting for the priest to begin Mass (the beautifully rendered chapters of Book IV suggest that thought), in the quiet of one's home or club, or even in bus or underground to and from business. The printing and form are equally admirable, since the volume will fit in any reasonable bag or pocket.

*Six Medieval Men and Women*, by H. S. Bennett (Cambridge University Press 15s).

THESE SIX TYPES bring vividly before the mind the state of English society in the late Middle Ages. They range from the warlike and pleasure-loving Humphrey, Duke of Gloucester, to a small farmer, a tenant on a feudal estate, one Richard Bradwater, a troublesome agitator akin in mind and method to some our own days have seen. The pageant includes Sir John Fastolf, a regular soldier who "after thirty years campaigning in France retired to his estates to be the terror" of friends, enemies and relatives! Next comes a literary, even poetical, civil servant, Thomas Hoccleve, who "spent his days at the Privy Seal, his youthful nights at the tavern," dunning others and the victim of duns. Margaret Paston, a most charming mother and housewife in Norfolk, with the saintly but forceful mystic of Lynn, Margery Kempe, complete the list. We meet other characters by the way who bring out the qualities and add considerably to the interest of the original six.

This is an extremely entertaining and informative book with a really valuable index for any student of history.

*Juliana of Norwich: An Appreciation and an Anthology*, by P. Franklin Chambers (Gollancz 15s).

THIS ATTRACTIVE VOLUME is by a scholarly Free-Church minister whose interest in his subject has clearly been very wide and long-standing. It has taken definite shape in this book chiefly owing to the recent rebuilding of the chapel and shrine of St. Julian of Mans, near Norwich, on 8 May 1953, after its destruction by enemy action on 27 June 1942. It was one of the oldest Norwich churches and that

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"from which, as a recluse, she possibly took her name." The book is divided into two parts. The scope of the first part is indicated by its chapter-headings: "Adolescence and Apocalypse," "Vision and Vocation," "Anchoress and Author," "Renaissance and Relevance." A Catholic reader may not always wholly agree with certain statements, but the spirit of reverence and the painstaking efforts to clarify difficulties in throwing light on a fascinating personality of the troubled fourteenth-century are beyond praise. The second part is an "Interpretive Anthology," admirably conceived and grouped under clear headings, and the whole completed by One Hundred Aphorisms from what Donald Attwater has declared "the tenderest and most beautiful exposition in the English language of God's loving dealings with men."

*A Book of Spiritual Instruction*, by Ludovicus Blosius, translated from the Latin by Bertrand A. Wilberforce, O.P. (Burns and Oates 10s 6d).

THIS IS FAR MORE than a reprint in the Orchard Series of the 1900 first edition of this golden little classic amongst spiritual books. Though the editor has wisely given the charming letter in which Blosius explains the gift of his treatise, "which I wrote for my own use," to his friend Florentius a Monte, a new preface has replaced the old one, more informative about Blosius's history and background and also the deliberate aim of his "Book of Spiritual Instruction." This aim was that "all men ought to aspire after perfection" chiefly by means of union with God. In a very practical way that purpose is followed through twelve short chapters contained within a hundred pages. One great merit of the book is the very orderly Table of Contents, where the reader at a glance can choose some subject for reading and reflection that will help in the time at his disposal. Indeed it is impossible to set out the varied riches of this friendly four-century-old treatise, arranged with all the reality and freshness of a deeply spiritual soul eager to instruct and encourage others in the wisdom of God.

*The Day of the Monkey*, by David Karp (Gollancz 15s).

IN HIS BOOK called *One* the author described the attempt of state officials to annihilate a man's personality and replace it by another that would be more satisfactory to them. The procedure failed; and readers felt free to decide whether this procedure was possible, an experiment likely to succeed and become general. Recent history supplies too many examples of the destructive part of the enterprise. But this new book is at every point dreadfully probable. It concerns a nationalist revolt in a British Protectorate in Africa. Here we see the true Natives, men especially from the mountains, savage by instinct,

yet needing outside influence both to stimulate them into action and, emphatically, to give them cohesion; also, the inflammatory yet futile student-class and the petty professional class; the semi-idealist son of a "holy man" who could be used as an inspiration; and of course the Communist *agent provocateur*, serving Russia so far as it paid him to do so. Here also is the British community, with its military element headed by a detestable Colonel Letch, and civilians as low-class mentally as any described by Mr. Graham Greene in *The Heart of the Matter*. (They all bolted when trouble seemed imminent.) The book really hinges on the personalities of the Governor, Pellman, and a native, Dr. Luba. Each, in a welter of corruption, retains his integrity, though Luba, a pure nationalist, desires a revolution that may be bloodily *defeated*, because blood, not theories and arguments, is what can really be understood and create. Mr. Karp crowds an enormous number of persons and pictures into his 382 pages which, though so exotic, are convincingly alive, the more so because even the idealists, Pellman and Luba, are imperfect though, in the midst of debauchery, true to their "pattern." He is right if he means to suggest that any pattern, undesignated by God, will not hold together; but also, alas, when he perceives how few are the Christians who behave like Christians.

*The Lamb*, by François Mauriac, translated by Gerard Hopkins (Eyre and Spottiswoode 12s 6d).

IT CAN BE SAID of M. Mauriac, as it can be said of all too few, that whatever he writes is worth reading. So much therefore can likewise be said of this his latest novel. The touches of the master-hand in the descriptive passages as well as in the drawing of the characters are unimpaired. Yet something is lacking. The hero, a young man with a vocation (one is irresistibly reminded of the hero of that earlier masterpiece, *That Which Was Lost*) turns aside at the instance of a wicked acquaintance who has just left his wife, he being persuaded, or persuading himself, that it is God's will that he should undertake at once the task of reconciling husband and wife. They are a childless couple but have taken in, with a view to adoption, a small boy towards whom they behave with a brutality which makes one feel devoutly thankful that they have been denied a family of their own. The boy is protected to a certain extent by a young orphan, Dominique, who is attached to the person of old Madame Pian (a now aged Brigitte Pian from an earlier work) as a sort of slave, secretary or ladies' maid. Xavier, the hero aforesaid, eventually succeeds in his dedicated task, but in the teeth of provocations, insinuations and spying on the part of the married couple, under the "cold, enormous and congealed malignity" of the mother-in-law, and finally at the cost of his own life when he collides accidentally on a bicycle with the husband's car. The whole

effect, it must be admitted, is of M. Mauriac caricaturing himself. The symbolic incidents in Xavier's *via dolorosa* are too heavily underlined, as is equally the diabolical wickedness of almost everyone else. Xavier himself moreover is too weak and friable a character to bear the weight of the claims which the author makes for him. Only to those who come to this as their first Mauriac novel can it be recommended; to others it might well be disappointing.

*Blessing Unbounded*, by Harry Blamires (Longmans 12s 6d).

IN THIS BOOK Mr. Blamires sets himself—perhaps inadvertently—in direct comparison with C. S. Lewis's treatment of the same idea: a neutral region outside heaven, where the disembodied spirit must make a final choice; and where the protagonist meets typical cases of acceptance, rejection or delay, and is himself returned to earth unfulfilled. The author, however, perhaps wisely, makes no attempt to imagine the state of a disembodied spirit, not yet freed from time, in an eternal world. This makes the setting unconvincing and, in spite of some shrewd and sincere moral analysis, the story does not grip. The angels are still alarmingly like the dear rector, always so *wise*, and the ship is an effective image of the Church of England, gloriously comprehensive rather than universal. Moral and theologic truths may, sometimes must, be expressed figuratively, and this amiable and well-intentioned book is in good company. But the loquacity of its ghosts rather suggests the leisures of some clerical clubroom than the urgencies of its chosen theme, and its social and moral criticism would seem more cogent in another context than that of the Four Last Things.

*The Devil: Notes for a Future Diabology*, by Giovanni Papini, translated by Adrienne Foulke (Eyre and Spottiswoode 15s).

CERTAINLY NO MYSTERY, in the moral sphere, is greater than that of sin and its perpetuation in the case of the lost and of the fallen angels and Satan in particular. Sgr. Papini longs for a universal *apokatastasis* such as was foreseen by Origen and a few of his followers, and many modern writers, though most of them unbelievers, treat the Devil as a dramatic figure in a myth; others, for instance, Longfellow, see him as part of the universal plan.

Since God suffers him to be  
He too is God's minister  
And labours for some good  
By us not understood.

We do not think that Papini discusses Juliana of Norwich, nor does he seem to know the big book entitled *Satan* published a few years ago

in the *Etudes Carmélitaines*, a serious study beside which Papini's (despite an immense width of reading) remains superficial. He knows that the ultimate salvation of the Devil and the "damned" clashes "at present" with the Church's tradition, and he comforts himself with the idea that *aionios*, everlasting, means "lasting for an era," *i.e.*, as long as *this* world shall last. Unfortunately the word applies to happiness as well as to woe. He speculates at great length about the reason for Satan's fall, but comes down with a thud when he decides that *France* is the "promised land of Satanism." He seems not to know that the Tempter was represented in the Catacombs just like other angels though with some small distinguishing mark. Sgr. Papini has always been a well-intentioned, enthusiastic and erudite *enfant terrible*, and perhaps his book will receive a warning rather than be prohibited.

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